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Abstract
This paper shows how agents’ choice in communicative action can be
designed to mitigate the effect of their resource limits in the context of
particular features of a collaborative planning task. I first motivate a
number of hypotheses about effective language behavior based on a sta-
tistical analysis of a corpus of natural collaborative planning dialogues.
These hypotheses are then tested in a dialogue testbed whose design is
motivated by the corpus analysis. Experiments in the testbed examine
the interaction between (1) agents’ resource limits in attentional capac-
ity and inferential capacity; (2) agents’ choice in communication; and (3)
features of communicative tasks that affect task difficulty such as inferen-
tial complexity, degree of belief coordination required, and tolerance for
errors. The results show that good algorithms for communication must
be defined relative to the agents’ resource limits and the features of the
task. Algorithms that are inefficient for inferentially simple, low coordi-
nation or fault-tolerant tasks are effective when tasks require coordination
or complex inferences, or are fault-intolerant. The results provide an ex-
planation for the occurrence of utterances in human dialogues that, prima
facie, appear inefficient, and provide the basis for the design of effective
algorithms for communicative choice for resource limited agents.
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1 Introduction
Agents may engage in conversation for a range of reasons, e.g. to acquire infor-
mation, to establish a contract, to make a plan, or to be social. At each point
in a dialogue, agents must make communicative choices about what to say and
how and when to say it. This paper focuses on agents’ communicative choice
in collaborative planning dialogues, dialogues whose purpose is to discuss and
agree on a plan for future action, and potentially execute that plan. I will ar-
gue that agents’ choices in communicative action, their algorithms for language
behavior, must be determined with respect to two relatively unexplored factors
in models of collaborative planning dialogues: (1) agents’ resource limits, such
as limits in attentional and inferential capacity; and (2) features of collabora-
tive planning tasks that affect task difficulty, such as inferential complexity, the
degree of belief coordination required, and tolerance for errors.
A primary dimension of communicative choice is the degree of explicitness.
For example, consider a simple task of agent A and agent B trying to agree on
a plan for furnishing a two room house. Imagine that A wants B to believe the
proposition realized by 1 and believes that B can infer this from the propositions
realized in 2:1
(1) If we agree to put the green couch in the study, we will have a matched-pair
of furniture in the study.
(2) a. I propose that we put the green couch in the study.
b. We intend to put the green chair in the study.
c. Two furniture items of the same color in the same room achieve a
matched pair.
In naturally-occurring dialogues, A may produce utterances realizing the
propositions in 3 to 6, or other variations [Sadock, 1978, Cohen, 1987, Webber and Joshi, 1982,
Walker, 1993b].
(3) A: I propose that we put the green couch in the study.
(4) A: We intend to put the green chair in the study. I propose that we put
the green couch in the study.
(5) A: Two furniture items of the same color in the same room achieve a
matched pair. We intend to put the green chair in the study. I propose
that we put the green couch in the study.
(6) A: I propose that we put the green couch in the study. That will get us a
matched pair.
1These examples are from the domain of Design-World to be discussed in section 4 and
are abstractions from naturally occurring examples in which the propositions realized here are
realized in a number of different ways. Here the focus is on the logical relationships between
the contents of each proposition: 2a and 2b are minor premises and 2c is the major premise
for the inference under discussion.
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The communicative choices in 3 through 6 illustrate a general fact: for any
communicative act, the same effect can be achieved with a range of acts at
various levels of explicitness. This raises a key issue: On what basis does A
choose among the more or less explicit versions of the proposal in 3 to 6?
The single constraint that has been suggested elsewhere in the literature is
the redundancy constraint: A should not say information that B already
knows, or that B could infer. The redundancy constraint appears in the
form of simple dictums such as ‘Don’t tell people what they already know’,
as Grice’s Quantity Maxim ’do not make your contribution more informative
than is required’[Grice, 1975] and as constraints on planning operators for the
generation and recognition of communicative plans[Allen and Perrault, 1980,
Cawsey, 1991, Cohen, 1978, Moore and Paris, 1993, Litman and Allen, 1990]. So,
if we assume that B knows 2b and 2c, then the only possibility for what A can
say is 3.
The redundancy constraint is based on the assumption that agent A
should leave implicit any information she believes that B already knows or she
believes that B could infer, in other words, that agent B can always ‘fill in
what is missing’ by a combination of retrieving facts from memory and making
inferences. In section 2, I will show that agents in natural dialogues consistently
violate the redundancy constraint. I will argue that this should not be
particularly surprising since the redundancy constraint is based on several
simplifying assumptions:
1. unlimited working-memory assumption: everything an agent knows
is always available for reasoning;
2. logical omniscience assumption: agents are logically omniscient;
3. fewest utterances assumption: utterance production is the only pro-
cess that should be minimized;
4. no autonomy assumption: assertions and proposals by Agent A are
accepted by default by Agent B.
When agents are autonomous and resource-limited, these assumptions do
not always hold, and the problem of communicative choice remains.
The plan for the paper is as follows: section 2 motivates a number of hypothe-
ses about the relationship of communicative choice, resource limits and task
features using evidence from natural collaborative planning dialogues. These
hypotheses are the basis of a model of collaborative planning presented in sec-
tion 3. Then section 4 describes how the model is implemented in a testbed
for collaborative planning dialogues called Design-World, which supports ex-
periments on the interaction of agents’ communicative choice, resource limits,
and features of the task. At this point, in section 4.1, I review the steps of the
method applied so far, and motivate the use of simulation as a method for test-
ing the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the experimental results and discusses
the extent to which the hypotheses were confirmed, and then section 6 discusses
the theoretical implications of these results and the extent to which they can be
generalized to other tasks, agent properties, and communication strategies.
2 Communicative choice in Dialogue
Naturally occurring collaborative planning dialogues are design, problem solv-
ing, diagnostic or advice-giving dialogues[Cawsey et al., 1992, Cohen, 1987, Reichman, 1985,
3
Grosz, 1977, Webber and Joshi, 1982, Finin et al., 1986, Pollack, 1986, Clark and Schaefer, 1989,
Traum, 1991, Whittaker and Stenton, 1988]. In order to generate hypotheses
about the relation of communicative choice to agent properties and task fea-
tures, this section examines communicative choice in naturally occurring col-
laborative planning dialogues. Most of the examples discussed below are ex-
cerpts from a corpus of dialogues from a radio talk show for financial planning
advice [Pollack et al., 1982],2 but I will also draw on data from collaborative de-
sign, collaborative construction, and computer support dialogues [Cohen, 1984,
Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Whittaker and Stenton, 1988, Whittaker et al., 1993].
Dialogue, in general, is modeled as a process by which conversants add to
what is assumed to be already mutually believed or intended. This set of as-
sumed mutual beliefs and intentions is called the discourse model, or the
common ground[Webber, 1978, Stalnaker, 1978]. In collaborative planning
dialogues, the conversants are attempting to add mutual beliefs about the cur-
rent state of the world and mutual beliefs and intentions about a plan for future
action to the discourse model. It is obvious that the efficacy of the final plan
and the efficiency of the planning process must be affected by agents’ algorithms
for communicative choice.
However previous work has not systematically varied factors that affect com-
municative choice, such as resource limits and task complexity. Furthermore,
most previous work has been based on the redundancy constraint, and ap-
parently, its concomitant simplifying assumptions (but see [Zukerman and Pearl, 1986,
Zukerman and McConachy, 1993, Lenke, 1994]).
To explore the relation of communicative choice to effective collaborative
planning, the analysis of naturally occurring collaborative planning dialogues in
this paper focuses on communicative acts that violate the redundancy con-
straint. These acts are informationally redundant utterances, IRUs,
defined as:3
Definition of Informational Redundancy
An utterance ui is informationally redundant in a discourse
situation S
1. if ui expresses a proposition pi, and another utterance uj that
entails pi has already been said in S.
2. if ui expresses a proposition pi, and another utterance uj that
presupposes or implicates pi has already been said in S.
A statistical analysis of the financial advice corpus showed that about 12
% of the utterances are IRUs. As mentioned in section 1, this should not be
particularly surprising since the definition of IRUs reflects several simplifying
assumptions. For example, the definition reflects the logical omniscience
assumption because it assumes that all the entailments of propositions uttered
in a discourse and certain default inferences from propositions uttered in a
discourse become part of the discourse model.4 The definition reflects the no
autonomy assumption because it assumes that merely saying an utterance
2The corpus consists of 55 dialogues from 5 hours of live radio broadcast, where each
dialogue ranged in length from 23 to 100 turns.
3The first part of the definition is a variation on Hirschberg’s definition of
redundant[Hirschberg, 1985] which is used in her theory of scalar implicature. This view
of information is also the basis of information theoretic work such as[Barwise, 1988].
4Presuppositions and implicatures are two types of default inferences[Grice, 1967,
Karttunen and Peters, 1979, Gazdar, 1979, Levinson, 1983, Thomason, 1990a]. The corpus
analysis tagged defaults separately from entailments but found no evidence for a functional
difference (see Walker93c).
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uj that expresses a proposition pi is sufficient for adding pi to the discourse
model. The fact that IRUs occur shows that the simplifying assumptions are
not valid.
The distributional analysis suggests that there are at least 3 functional cat-
egories of IRUs:
Communicative Functions of IRUs:
• Attitude: to provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual under-
standing and acceptance
• Attention: to manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse partici-
pants by making a proposition salient.
• Consequence: to augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain
inferences are licensed
IRUs have antecedents in the dialogue which are the utterances that orig-
inally realized the content of the IRU either through direct assertion or by an
inferential chain; in the definition above uj is an antecedent for ui. The 3 com-
municative functions of IRUs were identified by correlations with distributional
features based in part on relations between the IRU and its antecedent, such as
textual distance, discourse structure relations, and logical relations. The dis-
tributional analysis also analyzed utterance features such as the intonational
realization of the IRU, the form of the IRU, and the relation of the IRU to
adjacent utterances.
Below, I will briefly give examples of each type of IRU.5 For each type I
will explain how the four simplifying assumptions of previous dialogue models
predict that the utterance is informationally redundant. Then we will consider
hypothetical agent and task properties under which IRUs function as hypothe-
sized above.
2.1 Attitude IRUs
Attitude IRUs provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding
and acceptance by demonstrating the speaker’s attitude to an assertion or pro-
posal made by another agent in dialogue. An Attitude IRU, said with a falling
intonation typical of a declarative utterance, is given in 7-27, where M repeats
what H has asserted in 7-26. M and H have been discussing how M and her
husband can handle funds invested in IRAs (Individual Retirement Accounts).
In 7, and in the other naturally occurring examples below, the antecedents
of the IRUs are italicized and the IRUs are in CAPS.
(7) (24) H: That is correct. It could be moved around so that each of you
have two thousand.
(25) M: I see.
(26) H: Without penalty.
(27) M: WITHOUT PENALTY.
(28) H: Right.
5Each communicative function given above includes a number of subtypes that will not be
represented by these examples. In addition, the hypothesis that IRUs are a rehearsal mecha-
nism, i.e. agents repeat propositions as an aid to memory, is tested in every experiment by the
model of Attention/Working memory. The hypothesis that agents say IRUs because they can-
not think of anything else to say, (the dead air hypothesis), was considered in [Walker, 1992],
but I as yet have found no evidence to support it. For example, other indications of hesitation
or planning what to say, such as disfluencies and long pauses, are not associated with IRUs.
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(29) M: And the fact that I have a, an account of my own from a couple
of years ago, when I was working, doesn’t affect this at all.
The IRU in 27 provides direct evidence that M heard exactly what H said
[Clark and Schaefer, 1989, Brennan, 1990]. According to arguments elaborated
below and elsewhere [Walker, 1992, Walker, 1993b], M’s response indirectly pro-
vides evidence that she accepts and therefore believes what H has asserted.
header: inform(speaker, hearer, proposition)
precondition: know (speaker,proposition)
want-precondition: speaker want inform(speaker, hearer, proposition)
effect: know (hearer,proposition)
Figure 1: Definition of the inform plan operator in Allen and Perrault, 1980
The classification of 7-27 as an IRU follows from the no-autonomy as-
sumption. The no-autonomy assumption is usually characterized as an
agent being ”co-operative” or ”helpful”. For example, the motivation for the
plan effect of the inform planning operator from [Allen and Perrault, 1980] in
figure 1 is that the hearer is cooperative. In other words, a cooperative hearer al-
ways accepts and therefore believes (or knows) what the speaker has previously
asserted. But if the effect of the inform act always goes through, then there is
no reason for M to choose to produce an Attitude IRU in 7-27, in response to
H’s inform in 7-26.
In recent work, the plan effect shown in figure 1 is treated as a default
[Joshi et al., 1986, Reiter, 1980, Perrault, 1990, Grosz and Sidner, 1990]. Per-
rault’s Belief Transfer Rule handles inferring the default acceptance of asser-
tions (inform acts), while Grosz and Sidner’s Conversational Default Rule CDR2
handles inferring the default acceptance of proposals [Grosz and Sidner, 1990,
Perrault, 1990]. In both cases, the default inference of acceptance of an asser-
tion of P or a proposal to achieve P depends on the cooperativity of the hearer
and on whether or not the hearer previously believed or intended to achieve
¬P. However, Attitude IRUs are produced in many situations, where there is
no reason for the default not to go through. In advice giving dialogues, the
hearer is cooperative and the hearer does not previously believe or intend to
achieve ¬P, yet Attitude IRUs are common when the caller asks a the talk show
host a question and then repeats or paraphrases his response to the question
with an Attitude IRU.
Clark and Schaefer proposed that Attitude IRUs provide positive evidence of
understanding [Clark and Schaefer, 1987, Clark and Schaefer, 1989, Brennan and Hulteen, 1995].
They allow for understanding to be implicitly conveyed, but say that the amount
of explicit positive evidence should be ‘sufficient for current purposes’. How-
ever, Clark and Schaefer do not address the question of belief transfer since they
do not distinguish between indicating understanding and indicating acceptance.
Furthermore, they make no predictions about what features of current purposes
require more or less positive evidence, and thus lead an agent to produce an
Attitude IRU.
Thus, neither the addition of defaults nor the positive evidence model makes
any predictions about when an agent should produce an Attitude IRU, since the
inference of acceptance goes through by default without the Attitude IRU.
In order to explain the function of Attitude IRUs, the no-autonomy as-
sumption must be replaced with the assumption that hearers always either
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explicitly or implicitly accept or reject each utterance act that is intended to
change their beliefs or intentions. In section 3, these observations are incorpo-
rated into ahe model of collaborative planning dialogue. Results from testing
hypotheses related to the choice to produce Attitude IRUs are presented else-
where [Walker, 1992, Walker, 1993b, Walker, 1994b], and will not be discussed
further in this paper.
2.2 Consequence IRUs
Consequence IRUs make inferences explicit. For example, consider 8-17:
(8) (15) H: Oh no. I R A’s were available as long as you are not a partic-
ipant in an existing pension
(16) j. Oh I see. Well I did work, I do work for a company that has a
pension
(17) H: ahh. THEN YOU’RE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE
In 8, 8-15 realizes a biconditional inference rule, 8-16 instantiates one of the
premises of this rule, and 8-17 realizes an inference that follows from 8-15 and
8-16, for the particular tax year of 1981, by the inference rule of modus tollens.
The definition of 8-17 as an IRU follows from the logical omniscience
assumption. If all entailments of utterances are automatically added to the dis-
course model then 8-17 should not occur. However it is well known that neither
human nor artificial agents are logically omniscient [Norman and Bobrow, 1975,
Johnson-Laird, 1991, Goldman, 1986, Konolige, 1986, Hayes-Roth and Thorndyke, 1979].
Agents might not have enough time to make all the relevant inferences even when
they know all the relevant inference rules [Konolige, 1985], especially since pro-
ducing and interpreting speech in real time has heavy planning and processing
requirements. Thus plausible hypotheses are that:
• HYPOTH-C1: Agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to demon-
strate that they made the inference that is made explicit.
• HYPOTH-C2: Agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to ensure
that the other agent has access to inferrable information.
These hypotheses are motivated by the fact that agents are not logically
omniscient. In addition, in the case of hypothesis C2, agents may choose to
produce Consequence IRUs to ensure that the other agents have access to in-
ferrable information in a timely manner, even when, in principle, they believe
the other agent is capable of making the inference.
However, much of communicative efficiency relies on the fact that agents do
make some inferences from what has been said. Thus plausible refinements of
hypotheses C1 and C2 are that:
• HYPOTH-C3: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to a measure of ‘how hard’ the inference is.
• HYPOTH-C4: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to a measure of ‘how important’ the inference is.
• HYPOTH-C5: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to the degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on
the inferences that they have made.
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Confirmation of these hypotheses entails that the fewest utterances as-
sumption does not hold whenever processing effort is relevant to achieving the
conversational goals.
2.3 Attention IRUs
Attention IRUs manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants
by making a proposition salient. Attention IRUs often realize facts that are
inferentially related to the assertion or proposal that the speaker is making. For
example, consider 9 said by agent A to agent B while walking to work:
(9) a. Let’s walk along Walnut St.
b. IT’S SHORTER.
Agent B already knew that the Walnut Street route was shorter, so, by the
redundancy constraint, A should have simply said 9a.
The classification of 9b as an IRU reflects the unlimited working memory
assumption. If everything an agent knows is always available for reasoning, then
agents should never make communicative choices to include utterances such as
9b. However, it is well known that human agents have limited attention/working
memory [Miller, 1956, Norman and Bobrow, 1975, Baddeley, 1986], and resource
bounded artificial agents with limited time to access memory also have limited
attentional capacity.
If we define salient propositions as those that are accessible to a resource
limited agent at a particular point in time [Prince, 1981, Prince, 1992], then a
possible hypothesis is that A said 9b to provide B with a salient reason to accept
A’s proposal to walk along Walnut St. Similar observations apply to (10):
(10) a. Clinton has to take a stand on abortion rights for poor women.
b. HE’S THE PRESIDENT.
Here (10b) is already known to the discourse participants, but saying it
makes it salient. In order to account for 10b we must modify the specific hy-
pothesis above to reflect the difference in utterance type between 9a and 10a.
Utterance 9a is a proposal whereas 10a is an inform. In 10, A said 10b to
provide B with a salient reason to accept A’s assertion about Clinton’s obliga-
tions. Utterance 9b is a warrant for adopting A’s proposal in 9a, and 10b is
support for belief in A’s assertion.6
• HYPOTH-A1: Agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes
of deliberating beliefs and intentions.
Hypothesis A1 means that the production of Attention IRUs is a surface
manifestation of the fact that agents’ limited working memory limits the ac-
cessibility of beliefs used as the basis of deliberation. The hypothesis that the
function of Attention IRUs is to make information salient to support interpre-
tation and reasoning is formulated in the discourse inference constraint:
HYPOTH-A2: There is a discourse inference constraintwhose
effect is that inferences in dialogue are derived from propositions that
are currently discourse salient (in working memory).
6The relationship between these utterances has been characterized as the inference of a
discourse relation [Mann and Thompson, 1987], or the inference of the speaker’s intention
[Moore and Paris, 1993]. Moser and Moore and Hobbs have argued that these two views are
functionally equivalent [Moser and Moore, 1993, Hobbs, 1994].
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The discourse inference constraint is quite general since the infer-
ences that A intends B to make may be any inferences related to the dialogue
such as logical deductions, commonsense defaults, inferring part of A’s plan,
or inferring relations such as warrant or support [Webber and Joshi, 1982,
Moore and Paris, 1993, Walker, 1994a].
A more complex example illustrating the relationship of limited working
memory, inferential processing, and agents’ communicative choice is dialogue
11. The caller E has been telling H, the talk show host, how all her money is
inveted and then poses a question in 10-3:
(11) ( 3) E: ..... and I was wondering – should I continue on with the
certificates or
( 4) H: Well it’s difficult to tell because we’re so far away from any of
them. But I would suggest this – if all of these are 6 month certificates
and I presume they are
( 5) E: yes
( 6) H: then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money
around
( 7) E: uh huh
( 8) H: Now in addition, how old are you?
.
(discussion about retirement investments consisting of 14 utterances)
.
(21) E: uh huh and
(22a) H: But as far as the certificates are concerned,
(22b) I’D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT.
(22c) THEY’RE ALL 6 MONTH CERTIFICATES.
(23) E: yes
(24) H: and I don’t like putting all my eggs in one basket.....
The utterances in 22b and 22c realize two propositions established as mutu-
ally believed in utterances 4 to 7, thus they are IRUs. Utterance 8 initiates a
subdialogue digression about retirement investments. Since the discussion about
retirement investments consist of 14 utterances in which the information in 4
to 7 is not discussed, a plausible hypothesis is that, at 22a, H believes that the
information expressed in 4 to 7 is no longer salient [Walker, 1995a]. However,
H expects E to use this information to make two inferences: (1) that having
all your investments in 6 month certificates is an instance of the negatively
evaluated condition of having all your eggs in one basket; and (2) that this is
a warrant for E to adopt the intention to spread the certificates out a little
bit. Here, therefore, we see two types of inferences: a content-based inference,
instance of, in the first case and a deliberation-based inference, warrant,
in the second. It appears that H produces IRUs to ensure that these inferences
get made and that H is basing his communicative choice on the discourse
inference constraint.
In addition to the naturally occurring examples of Attention IRUs, another
source of evidence for the discourse inference constraint is the distri-
bution of IRUs that make inferences explicit such as the Consequence IRU in
dialogue 8, 7. Figure 2 contrasts the distribution of Consequence IRUs and
paraphrases, which are two different ways in which an IRU can relate logically
to the prior discourse.7 Paraphrases are syntactic or semantic transformations
of a single antecedent utterance [McKeown, 1983, Joshi, 1964]. Inferences are
7The other categories are repetitions, making implicatures explicit and making presuppo-
sitions explicit.
9
Consequence IRUs Paraphrase IRUs
Antecedents Salient 24 43
Antecedents Not Salient 8 39
Figure 2: Distribution of Consequence IRUs that make inferences explicit, as
compared with Paraphrases, according to whether their antecedents are cur-
rently salient
distinguished from paraphrases by requiring the application of a logical inference
rule such as modus ponens. A key difference is that inferences have multiple
antecedents while paraphrases do not. A priori we would not expect infer-
ences and paraphrases, as two types of entailments, to distribute differently
with respect to whether their antecedents are salient.8 However figure 2 shows
that inferences are more likely to have salient premises than paraphrases
(χ2 = 4.835, p < .05, df = 1). This distributional fact provides evidence for the
discourse inference constraint because whenever we have evidence that
an inference has been made, the premises are likely to be salient.
The data discussed above provide evidence for the discourse inference
constraint, however it is clear that the effect of the constraint is strongly
determined by the limits on working memory. In particular, a corollary of the
constraint is that inferential complexity can be directly related to the number
of premises that must be simultaneously salient for the inference to be made.
These hypotheses can be summarized as follows:
• HYPOTH-A3: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree of inferential complexity of a task as measured by the number of
premises required to make task related inferences.
• HYPOTH-A4: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree to which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity.
Finally, it is obvious that various tasks can be characterized in terms of the
degree of inferential complexity, and that observations about belief coordination
similar to those made about Consequence IRUs also apply to Attention IRUs,
giving hypothesis A5.
• HYPOTH-A5: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the infer-
ences that they have made.
In the next sections we will see how we can test these hypotheses.
3 Modeling resource-limited collaborative plan-
ning dialogues
The naturally occurring examples discussed in the previous section gave rise to
a number of hypotheses as to the situations in which communicative choices
8For the corpus-analysis, salient utterances are those within the last two turns. This
measure is not perfect but it is replicable.
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PLAN LIBRARY
DESIRES
PERCEPTION  OF
    MESSAGES
INTENTIONS
MEANS-ENDS REASONER
ATTENTION/WORKING MEMORY (AWM)
BELIEFS
BELIEF DELIBERATION
COMMUNICATIVE ACTIONS
(mediated by dialogue strategies)
MESSAGE PLANNING
FILTERING MECHANISM
ENVIRONMENT
intentions
options
options
surviving options
INTENTION DELIBERATION
COMPATIBILITY FILTER
Figure 3: The IRMA Agent Architecture for Resource-Bounded Agents with
Limited Attention (awm)
to include IRUs could either improve the efficacy of a collaborative plan or the
efficiency of the dialogue by which that plan was constructed. In this section,
I will specify the details of a model of collaborative planning that will be used
as the basis of the dialogue simulation testbed in which the hypotheses can
be tested. In thinking about models of collaborative planning, I have found it
useful to consider models in terms of 6 features:
1. agent architecture
2. role of resource limits: whether the agents constructing the collaborative
plan have limited resources, and thus whether there is an attempt to either
maximize or minimize any aspect of resource consumption, and if so which
aspects.
3. the mutual belief model: whether the function of the dialogue is to es-
tablish mutual beliefs, and whether the mutual belief model is binary or
allows for defaults in mutual beliefs.
4. utterance act types: types of acts available for agents to communicate
with other agents and the effects of each act on the cognitive state of the
agents and the collaborative planning process.
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5. mixed-initiative: whether one agent is the initiator or both agents have
equal initiative.9
6. plan evaluation: how the collaborative plan is evaluated and what factors
determine how good the collaborative plan is.
Most accounts of collaborative planning dialogues are not specific about
all of these features, although some accounts provide rich models of particular
features. For example, Smith and Guinn provide a richer model of mixed-
initiative than that provided here [Guinn, 1994, Smith et al., 1992], and there
are precise models of how hearers infer the utterance act type or the inten-
tion underlying a particular communicative action [Allen, 1983, Sidner, 1985,
Litman and Allen, 1990, Traum, 1994]. However, to my knowledge no previous
work has included a specification of the agent architecture, the relationship of
the architecture to language behavior, the role of resource limits, and the plan
evaluation process. The remainder of this section provides a specification for
each of these features.
3.1 Agent Architecture, Mutual Belief and Resource Lim-
its
Both the agent architecture and the role of resource limits are addressed by
adopting an agent architecture based on the IRMA architecture for resource-
bounded agents, shown in figure 3 [Bratman et al., 1988, Pollack and Ringuette, 1990].
The IRMA architecture has not previously been used to model the behavior of
agents in dialogue. The basic components of the modified IRMA architecture
are:
• Beliefs: a database of an agent’s beliefs. This includes beliefs that an
agent believes to be mutual to some degree.
• Belief deliberation: decides what an agent wants to believe when there is
conflicting evidence.
• Intentions: a database of an agent’s intentions. This includes intentions
that an agent believes to be mutual to some degree.
• Plan Library: what an agent knows about plans as recipes to achieve
goals.
• Means-end reasoner: reasons about how to fill in existing partial plans,
proposing options that serve as subplans for the plans an agent has in
mind.
• Filtering Mechanism: checks options for compatibility with the agent’s
existing plans. Options deemed compatible are passed along to the delib-
eration process.10
• Desires: Agents may have different types of desires but here I assume that
their only desire is to maximize utility[Doyle, 1992].
9This is also called ‘control’ [Whittaker and Stenton, 1988, Smith, 1980]. Walker and
Whittaker and Guinn argued that the distribution of control in natural dialogue is primarily
determined by whether information relevant to the task is distributed between the agents or
primarily known by one agent [Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Guinn, 1993].
10The filtering mechanism presented in [Bratman et al., 1988] and used in Tileworld is more
complex than that presented here because that work explored the issue of when current
intentions get over-ridden.
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• Intention Deliberation: decides which of a set of options to pursue (by an
evaluation based on desires such as maximizing utility).
• Attention/Working memory (awm): the limited attention module con-
strains working memory and the retrieval of current beliefs and intentions
that are used by the means-end reasoner.
For the purpose of modeling dialogue, the architecture has been extended
with a model of mutual belief that allows for different degrees of mutual belief.
For the purpose of exploring the effects of resource-bounds on attention, this
architecture has been extended with a model of limited attention. All of the
modules are standard except for the awm module described in detail below, and
the mutual belief module which will be briefly described.
Attention/working memory model The model of limited awm is a cog-
nitively based model adapted from [Landauer, 1975], which fits many empir-
ical results on human memory and learning [Hellyer, 1962, Landauer, 1969,
Collins and Quillian, 1969, Sternberg, 1967, Tulving, 1967, Anderson and Bower, 1973,
Solomon, 1992]. The motivation for using a cognitively based model of awm is
to model the behavior of agents in naturally occurring dialogues and to test a
theory of collaborative communication with humans.11
The key properties of the model are that (1) limits on awm are a parameter
of the model and can be varied to explore different limits [Baddeley, 1986]; (2)
items encountered more recently are more likely to be salient[Landauer, 1975];
(3) items encountered more frequently are more likely to be salient [Hintzmann and Block, 1971].
These recency and frequency effects are a key aspect of the awm model for
testing the hypothesized functions of IRUs. Below I will discuss a particular
implementation of this model and its role in testing the hypotheses.
awm is modelled as a three dimensional space in which propositions acquired
from perceiving the world are stored in chronological sequence according to
the location of a moving memory pointer. The sequence of memory loci used
for storage constitutes a random walk through memory with each loci a short
distance from the previous one. If items are encountered multiple times, they are
stored multiple times [Hintzmann and Block, 1971]. The fact that the sequence
of storage locations is random means that the recency and frequency effects
are stochastically determined. This means that when this model is used in
simulation, the simulation produces different results each time.
When an agent retrieves items from memory, search starts from the current
pointer location and spreads out in a spherical fashion. The resource limited
aspect of awm follows from the fact that search is restricted to a particular
search radius defined in Hamming distance. For example, if the current memory
pointer loci is (0 0 0), the loci distance 1 away would be (0 1 0) (0 -1 0) (0 0 1)
(0 0 -1) (-1 0 0) (1 0 0). The actual locations are calculated modulo the memory
size.
The limit on the search radius defines the subset of the belief and intentions
database that is salient. In addition, the fact that the pointer moves has the
effect that the salient subset is always changing. Effectively, as new facts are
added, others are displaced and become no longer salient, so that the salient
predicate is dynamic.
The search radius limit defines the awm parameter that will be varied in
the experiments in section 5 in order to test the effect of different resource
11 Some of the features of the model hold for processors in general, such as the feature that
items that have been discussed more recently are more likely to be accessible with little effort,
and that incoming information can displace other information from working memory.
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limitations. Experiments that Landauer performed showed that, for a task
requiring remembering whether a word belonged to a list of words, the model
can be parameterized so that an awm of 7 reproduces the human performance
results in [Hellyer, 1962]. Since no systematic tests have been performed for
human performance on the collaborative planning tasks investigated below, the
experiments are run at low, mid and high awm settings. Human performance
is assumed to fall somewhere in the middle of these ranges.
Using awm to implement the discourse inference constraint The model
of Attention/Working Memory (awm) provides a means of testing the hypoth-
esized discourse inference constraint introduced in section 2.3. Remem-
ber that the discourse inference constraint states that inferences in discourse
are derived from propositions that are currently in working memory. The
awm model, as shown in figure 3, limits the beliefs accessible for means-end
reasoning and deliberation to the subset of beliefs that are currently in awm
[Hayes-Roth and Thorndyke, 1979, Joshi, 1978, Joshi et al., 1984, Norman and Bobrow, 1975].
These beliefs are defined as being salient.
This model contrasts with the standard view of inference, where if an agent
believes P and believes P→Q, then the agent believes Q. The discourse inference
constraint provides a principled way of limiting inference in modeling humans
by requiring the premises of P and P→Q to be salient. An axiomatization
requires the predicate salient and inference rules as follows for each inference
rule schema[Walker, 1993b, Hobbs, 1994]:
Inference under the Discourse Inference Constraint:
Say(A,B,P) → Salient(B,P)
Salient(B,P) ∧ BEL(B,P) ∧ Salient(B,P→Q) ∧ BEL(B,P→Q)
→ BEL(B,Q)
The first inference rule states that whenever agent A says an utterance to B
that realizes proposition P, that P becomes salient for B. The second rule states
that whenever a proposition P and an inference rule, P→Q, are both believed
by B and salient for B, then B can use them to infer Q. The model of awm must
be consulted to determine when the salient predicate holds.
Mutual belief model The model of mutual belief is based on Lewis’s Shared
Environment model of mutual belief[Lewis, 1969, Clark and Marshall, 1981, Barwise, 1988],
extended to support different degrees of mutual belief by tagging beliefs with
qualitative endorsements at the time that they are formed and stored in the
beliefs database [Cohen, 1985, Gardenfors, 1988, Galliers, 1991a]. Different de-
grees of mutual belief allow some actions to be left to inference and some infer-
ences to be defaults. This makes it possible to distinguish between the explicit
acceptance of a proposal and the acceptance of a proposal inferred in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary. When agents are not logically omniscient,
it is possible to distinguish between mutual beliefs about what has been mu-
tually inferred and information that has been discussed in the dialogue. See
[Walker, 1992, Walker, 1993b] for more detail.
3.2 Discourse Acts, Utterance Acts, and Mixed Initiative
The overall structure of the discourse in collaborative planning dialogues is pri-
marily determined by the task structure [Power, 1974, Grosz, 1977, Litman, 1985,
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Figure 4: Finite State Model of Discourse Actions
Sibun, 1991]. Each subpart of the task consists of a dialogue segment in which
agents negotiate what they should do for that part of the task.
As discussed in section 2.1, we wish to abandon the no autonomy as-
sumption. The model should allow either agent to initiate the dialogue or ini-
tiate a subdialogue about a new part of the task [Walker and Whittaker, 1990,
Dahlback, 1991]. For each agent to be able to do this, knowledge about the
task must be distributed between the participants so that each participant has
a basis for means-end reasoning and deliberation.
Furthermore, agents should be able to accept or reject one another’s
proposals. Each plan step contributing to a higher level goal must remain open
for negotiation even if both agents are committed to coming up with a col-
laborative plan for the higher level goal. This contrasts with models in which
proposals for each plan substep that the initiator makes must be accepted by
the non-initiator, once the non-initiator has agreed to work on a collaborative
plan [Cohen and Levesque, 1991, Grosz and Sidner, 1990].
Discourse Acts and Mixed Initiative To engage in collaborative planning,
agents take turns sending messages, and each turn may consist of one or more
discourse acts. Discourse acts are opening, closing, proposal, accep-
tance, rejection and clarification. These are higher level acts that are
composed of primitives called utterance acts, which will be described below.
The schema of discourse actions shown in figure 4 controls the sequence of
discourse acts and which discourse acts can be combined into a single turn.12
The discourse act schema is the basis of an algorithm by which agents achieve
a collaborative-plan. For each step in the domain plan:
12This schema cannot describe all discourse action transitions in every type of dialogue
[Levinson, 1979, Levinson, 1981, Schegloff, 1987]. One required extension is to allow multiple
proposals to be simultaneously open[Rose et al., 1995, Sidner, 1994].
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1. individual agents perform means-end reasoning about options in the do-
main;
2. individual agents deliberate about which options are preferable;
3. then one agent initiates a subdialogue consisting minimally of a proposal
to the other agent, based on the options identified in a reasoning cycle,
about actions that contribute to the satisfaction of their goals;
4. then the proposal may be subject to clarification, after which it is
either accepted or rejected by the other agent, by calculating whether
it maximizes utility
This algorithm ties the discourse act schema in figure 4 to the IRMA ar-
chitecture. The requirement that agents must indicate whether they accept or
reject each proposal follows from replacing the assumption of cooperativity in
earlier work [Allen and Perrault, 1980, Grosz and Sidner, 1990] with the col-
laborative principle:
collaborative principle: Conversants must provide evidence of
a detected discrepancy in belief as soon as possible.
The collaborative principle was proposed in [Walker, 1992], and is an
abstraction of the collaborative planning principles of Whittaker and
Stenton (1988) and Walker and Whittaker (1990). The collaborative prin-
ciple means that speakers must monitor the next action by the hearer in order
to detect the effects of their utterances. If the hearer continues the dialogue
and provides no evidence of a belief discrepancy, the inference of acceptance is
licensed as a default [Galliers, 1990, Walker, 1992].
The fact that agents evaluate both assertions and proposals before deciding
what to believe or intend follows from the IRMA agent architecture in figure 3.
As the figure shows, incoming messages about intentions and beliefs are subject
to intention or belief deliberation. This provides the basis for abandoning the no
autonomy assumption while specifying why an agent would accept or reject
another agent’s proposal (see also [Galliers, 1989, Galliers, 1991b, Doyle, 1992]).
Agents evaluate assertions and proposals from other agents by assessing the
support for assertions and the warrants for proposals. Finally, as figure 3 shows,
this evaluation takes place under constraints of limited working memory, since
the beliefs that can serve as supports or warrants must be salient for these
processes to use them.
Utterance Acts Figure 4 shows the discourse act schema that provides the
basis for dialogue. Discourse acts are composed of utterance acts, which are the
primitive acts that an agent can actually perform. Each discourse act can be
performed in different ways by varying the number and type of utterance acts
that it consists of. For example, a proposal may or may not include additional
information that can convince the hearer, as in example 9b.
There are seven utterance act types: open, close, propose, accept,
reject, ask and say, which are realized via the schemas below:
(propose ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
(Ask ?speaker ?hearer ?belief)
(say ?speaker ?hearer ?belief)
(Accept ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
(Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?belief)
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(Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
(Open ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
(Close ?speaker ?hearer ?intention)
The content of each utterance act can be an options and intentions repre-
senting a domain plan act constructed by means-end reasoning and deliberation
as shown in figure 3. An option is an act that has not been committed to
by both agents. An intention is an act that has been committed to by both
agents[Pollack and Ringuette, 1990, Bratman et al., 1988]. An option only be-
comes an intention in the collaborative plan if it is accepted by both agents,
either explicitly or implicitly. The option in a reject schema is a counter-
proposal and what is rejected is the current proposal.
The content of an utterance act may also be a belief. These beliefs are either
those that an agent starts with, beliefs communicated by the other agent, or in-
ferences made by the agent during the conversation. Beliefs in ask actions have
variables that the addressee attempts to instantiate. The belief in a rejection
schema is a belief that the speaker believes is a reason to reject the proposal,
such as a belief that the preconditions for the option in the proposal do not hold
[Walker and Whittaker, 1990].
Examples of these utterance acts in dialogue will be given in section 4. Below
how B processes each of the 7 messages that A can send is specified. In the effects
specified below, Store means store in awm, for eventual long-term storage in the
beliefs database. The processing involved with each incoming message should
be understood with reference to the IRMA agent architecture.
1. Agent A: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
Agent B:
(a) Filter: Check whether ?option is compatible with current beliefs, e.g.
that no current beliefs contradict its preconditions.
(b) Infer and Store the preconditions of ?option
(c) Means-End Reason (ME-Reason) about Intention the ?option con-
tributes to.
(d) Deliberate by evaluating the ?option against other options generated
by Means-End reasoning.
(e) Indicate results of deliberation by an Accept or Reject.
2. Agent A: (Ask ?speaker ?hearer ?belief);
Agent B: retrieve beliefs matching ?belief from Memory and respond
with (say ?speaker ?hearer ?belief) with the variable instantiated for each
matching Belief.
3. Agent A: (say ?speaker ?hearer ?belief);
Agent B: Store ?belief
4. Agent A: (Accept ?speaker ?hearer ?option)13
Agent B:
(a) Store (intend A B ?option)14
13This is a simplification since the form of the acceptance determines the endorsement type
on the mutual belief that is added to the beliefs database.
14This represents that both agents are committed to the option while the binding of the
?option specifies the agent who will execute the option.
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(b) Store (Act-Effects ?option)
5. Agent A: (Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?option)
Agent B:
(a) Deliberate ?option in comparison with own current proposal that was
rejected.
(b) Accept ?option if better than your current proposal.
(c) If rejecting ?option then reject with reason for rejection.
6. Agent A: (Reject ?speaker ?hearer ?belief);
Agent B: Store ?belief
7. Agent A: (Open ?speaker ?hearer ?option);
Agent B: Mark the discourse segment that matches ?option as open
8. Agent A: (Close ?speaker ?hearer ?intention);
Agent B: Close the discourse segment for ?intention
These acts and their effects determine the structure of the dialogue and its
effect on the mental state of the conversants.
3.3 Plan Evaluation
There are three components of the plan evaluation process that have different
effects on collaborative planning. Two features are related to the task definition
and the third to the model of evaluation applied:
1. the degree of belief coordination: whether some or all of the intentions
associated with a plan must be mutually intended and whether any beliefs
related to the intended acts must also be mutually believed;
2. task determinacy and fault tolerance: whether the task has only one so-
lution, or is fault tolerant or more or less satisfiable.
3. the model must specify what is to be optimized and whose resource con-
sumption is to be minimized for performance evaluation.
Different theories of collaborative planning reflect different views of the de-
gree of belief coordination required for agents have a collaborative plan. The
minimal approach is to not require the agents to establish mutual beliefs at all
[Durfee et al., 1994, Guinn, 1994]. Rather agents divide up the plan into sub-
components and separately plan each component, without requiring agreement
on how the subcomponents are planned. At the next level of belief coordina-
tion, it is common to require the intended acts of the collaborative plan to be
mutually intended [Grosz and Sidner, 1990, Traum, 1994, Levesque et al., 1990,
Thomason, 1990b]. At the highest level of belief coordination, the agents must
both mutually intend all intentions and mutually believe any beliefs that sup-
port the plan such as the warrant beliefs that provide reasons for adopting a
step of the plan. In addition, it is possible to require that inferences about other
goals that the intended actions will satisfy should also be mutually believed.
In this work, the assumption is that the degree of belief coordination required
is a feature of the task. The minimal level in the experiments discussed below
will be that all intentions must be mutually intended, and the experiments will
vary whetherwarrants, and inferred intentions that are derived from explicitly
discussed intentions.
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Task determinacy and fault tolerance have an effect on communicative choice
in collaborative planning because they are directly related to how much uncer-
tainty is tolerable in the plan. If a partial plan has some utility, then making
a mistake or only constructing a partial plan is not catastrophic. For task
determinacy, I assume that a measure of the quality of the final plan can be
determined from the utility of each step in the plan, and that partial plans can
also be evaluated, so that the task is more or less satisfiable.
With respect to evaluating performance, I assume that the agents in a col-
laborative planning dialogue are working as a team, and as a team they at-
tempt to optimize the team’s performance and minimize the team’s consump-
tion of resources. This follows from Clark’s assumption that conversants in
dialogue attempt to achieve their dialogue purpose with least collaborative
effort[Clark and Schaefer, 1989, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986, Clark and Brennan, 1990].
This approach contrasts with other approaches in which agents only participate
in communication to the degree that it maximizes their own expected utility
[Durfee et al., 1994].
A final choice has to do with which processes collaborative effort consists
of. A common assumption is that the number of utterances is the primary effi-
ciency measure [Grice, 1975, Chapanis, 1975]; this is the fewest utterances
assumption. Since all types of IRUs violate this assumption, in this work col-
laborative effort is defined with reference to the agent architecture and to all the
processes required in collaborative planning, i.e. (1) retrieval processes neces-
sary to access previously stored beliefs in memory; (2) communicative processes
related to generating and interpreting utterances; and (3) reasoning processes
that operate on beliefs stored in memory and those communicated by other
agents. With respect to the IRMA architecture (figure 3), retrieval processes are
those that access awm, the plan library and the beliefs and intentions databases,
communicative processes are the modules for perception and generation of mes-
sages, and inferences are the combined processes of deliberation, means-ends
reasoning, and filtering. Collaborative effort includes the costs for both agents
for all of these processes:
collaborative effort =
(the total cost of communication for both agents)
+ (the total cost of inferences for both agents)
+ (the total cost of retrievals for both agents)
Collaborative effort is defined for the whole dialogue and not on a per utter-
ance basis. This definition and the other assumptions support the specification
of the plan evaluation process. Given the above definitions, performance is
the difference between a measure of the quality of the problem solution and
collaborative effort.
performance = quality of solution – collaborative ef-
fort
Since the agents’ desires are simply to maximize utility, the quality of the
solution is measured by the utility of the resulting plan with respect to the
agents’ utility functions.
4 Design-World
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4.1 Methodological Basis of Design-World
Design-World is a testbed for a theory of collaborative communication, which
instantiates the model of collaborative planning in dialogue discussed in section
3. In order to motivate the use of the Design-World testbed in developing and
testing a defeasible theory of communication in collaborative planning, this sec-
tion first describes Design-World as an instance of a general method, and then
describes the testbed and its implementation as well as the task and communi-
cation parameters. The method can be characterized by the steps below:
1. Generate hypotheses about the features of a model of collaborative plan-
ning dialogues from a statistical analysis of human-human dialogue cor-
pora.
2. Produce a functional characterization of the model, specifically including
the parameters that could affect task outcome, or claims about the efficacy
of the model.
3. Implement the model as a testbed so that (some of ) these parameters
can be controlled, while using independently motivated modules for other
aspects of testbed.
4. Test the hypotheses and the resulting model against different situations
controlled by parameter settings.
The hypotheses that were generated by the statistical analysis of the dialogue
corpora were discussed in section 2. These hypotheses are roughly that under
constraints of resource bounds, task inferential complexity, task fault tolerance,
and task requirements for belief coordination, communicative choices to include
IRUs can reduce collaborative effort or increase the quality of solution of the
collaborative plan.
The next step is to produce a functional characterization of the model (a
partial formalization). In section 3, I discussed features of a model of collab-
orative planning that interact with an agent’s autonomy, resource limits and
communicative choices. In nonexperimental work, the model is the final result
of the research. However, this leaves the model and the claims that motivated
the model empirically unverified. In formal characterizations, many simplifying
assumptions need to be made, and it is not always clear that the results carry
over to complex domains where the simplifying assumptions do not hold. While
the model presented here is empirically based on statistical analysis of a corpus
of naturally occurring dialogues, many of the hypotheses discussed above are
related to models of agents’ processing. Corpus analysis can only provide weak
support for these hypotheses. Thus another source of empirical verification is
desirable in order to develop a well-specified and defeasible theory. This is the
motivation for the Design-World testbed.
Next, it is necessary to consider the parameters that could affect the outcome
or claims about the efficacy of the model and then implement the model as a
testbed so that at least some of these parameters can be controlled. The use
of independently motivated modules for other aspects of the testbed guarantees
that the testbed actually tests something, and also makes it less likely that the
testbed is a case of ‘experimentation in the small’ [Hanks et al., 1993].
Parameters that affect the efficacious use of IRUs have already been dis-
cussed: these include resource bounds, task inferential complexity, and require-
ments for belief coordination. The awm model introduces a parameter for re-
source bounds, and is implemented as part of the IRMA architecture for re-
source limited agents, which is independently motivated [Bratman et al., 1988,
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Pollack and Ringuette, 1990]. The awm model itself is also independently mo-
tivated, since it reproduces in simulation many well known results on human
memory and learning [Landauer, 1975, Solomon, 1992]. In addition, the utter-
ance acts and their effects are independently motivated by other research on
collaborative planning dialogues and by the statistical analysis of dialogue cor-
pora [Whittaker and Stenton, 1988, Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Sidner, 1994,
Stein and Thiel, 1993, Reithinger and Maier, 1995, Carletta, 1992, Chu-Carrol and Carberry, 1995,
Traum, 1994].
To introduce parameters related to tasks, the testbed is designed around
a simple task where two agents must form a collaborative plan as to how to
arrange some furniture in the rooms of a two room house. The task is based on
cooperative design tasks used for experiments on distributed cooperative work
for which a corpus of dialogues was available [Whittaker et al., 1993]. However,
the simple task can be varied along three dimensions: (1) inferential complexity;
(2) degree of belief coordination required; (3) tolerance for errors and usefulness
of partial solutions.
These three task dimensions represent very different tasks. For example,
varying the task by increasing inferential complexity provides information on the
performance of agent communication algorithms in simple versus inferentially
complex tasks. The dimensions enable us to generalize from the specific task
in Design-World to real world tasks. Section 4.2 will introduce the Standard
version of the task, and then Section 4.4 will describe the task variations.
To introduce parameters related to the interaction of communicative choice
with task complexity and resource limits, agents are designed so that they vary
their communication strategies to include or not include IRUs. Section 4.5
will describe the communicative choice parameters that will be used in the
experimental results presented in section 5.
The experiments reported in section 5 will examine the interaction of three
factors: (1) resource limits; (2) communicative strategies; and (3) task defini-
tion. The experiments in the testbed have several functions: (1) they demon-
strate that the model can be implemented; (2) they highlight potential flaws
in the model; and (3) they provide empirical verification of hypotheses about
the function of particular communicative strategies beyond that provided by
corpus analysis and researcher’s intuitions. This section describes the domain,
the implementation of the collaborative planning model in this domain, the
communicative strategies and the task variations.
4.2 Design World Collaborative Planning Domain
In Design-World, two artificial parametrizable agents converse in order to agree
on the design of the floor plan of a two room house [Whittaker et al., 1993,
Walker, 1993b]. The design-house plan requires the agents to agree on how
to design-room-1 and design-room-2. At the beginning of the simulation,
both agents know the structure of the design-house plan and that it requires
four furniture items in each room. Each agent has 12 items of furniture that
can be used in the plan. A potential final collaborative design plan negotiated
via a (simulated) dialogue is shown in Figure 5.
Each furniture item has a value that is used both as a warrant to support
deliberation (the utility of an act that is under consideration), and as the basis
for calculating the quality of solution of the final plan, as discussed in
section 3. The values on the furniture items range from 10 to 56, and both
agents’ furniture items range over these values. Since beliefs about these values
will be used to test hypotheses about the function of IRUs, both agents know
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Figure 5: One Final State for Design-World Standard Task: Represents the
Collaborative Plan Achieved by the Dialogue, 434 points
the values of all the furniture items at the beginning of the dialogue.
Design-World agents negotiate a collaborative plan following the collabora-
tive planning algorithm discussed in section 3. Each agent carries out means-end
reasoning about the furniture items that can be used in the design. Means-end
reasoning generates options – these options are the content of proposals to
the other agent to put a furniture item into a room. This is illustrated by
Dialogue 12, which includes the artificial language that the agents communicate
with and a gloss automatically generated from that language in italics for part
of designing room-1.
(12) 1: BILL: First, put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-10: put-act (agent-bill green rug
room-1))
2: KIM: Then, let’s put the green lamp in the study.
(propose agent-kim agent-bill option-33: put-act (agent-kim green lamp
room-1))
3: BILL: Then, let’s put the green couch in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-45: put-act (agent-bill green couch
room-1))
4: KIM: No, instead let’s put the purple couch in the study.
(reject agent-kim agent-bill option-56: put-act (agent-kim purple couch
room-1))
5: BILL: Putting in the green couch is worth 56
(say agent-bill agent-kim bel-265: score (option-45: put-act (agent-bill
green couch room-1) 56))
6: BILL: It is better to put the green couch in the study.
(reject agent-bill agent-kim option-56: put-act (agent-bill green couch
room-1))
At the beginning of the dialogue, Agent-Kim has stored in memory the
proposition that (score green-rug 56). When she receives Bill’s proposal as
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shown in (12-1), she evaluates that proposal in order to decide whether to accept
or reject it. As part of evaluating the proposal she will attempt to retrieve the
score proposition stored earlier in memory. Thus the propositions about the
scores of furniture items are warrants for supporting deliberation.
As discussed in section 3, the agents retain their autonomy even though
the agents both want to agree on a plan for designing the house. Thus, on
receiving a proposal, an agent deliberates whether to accept or reject it
[Doyle, 1992, Walker, 1994b]. Proposals 1 and 2 are inferred to be implic-
itly accepted because they are not rejected [Whittaker and Stenton, 1988,
Walker and Whittaker, 1990]. This follows from the collaborative prin-
ciple discussed in section 3. If a proposal is accepted, either implicitly or ex-
plicitly, then the option that was the content of the proposal becomes a mutual
intention that contributes to the final design plan [Power, 1984, Walker, 1992,
Sidner, 1994].
Agents reject a proposal if deliberation leads them to believe that they
know of a better option, based on evaluating the utility of the competing op-
tions they have generated by means-end reasoning. For example, in (12-4) Kim
rejects the proposal in (12-3), for pursuing option-45, and proposes option-56
instead. The form of the rejection as a counter-proposal is based on observations
about how rejection is communicated in naturally-occurring dialogue as codified
in the collaborative planning principles [Walker and Whittaker, 1990].
When an agent intends to reject another agent’s rejection, as in 12-5 and 6, the
agent includes additional information to support its proposal. In 12-5, agent-bill
reminds agent-kim of the value of the green couch, before rejecting agent-kim’s
proposal.
4.3 Agent architecture implementation in Design-World
The agent architecture used in the Design-World simulation environment is
the modified IRMA architecture, shown in figure 3 and discussed in section 3
[Bratman et al., 1988, Pollack and Ringuette, 1990]. The only aspects of the
architecture that are specific to Design-World are the plan library, the way that
awm is implemented, and the way that belief deliberation is implemented.
For the experiments below, the total size of awm is set to 16, but memory
is wrap-around, and there is no overwriting. If the path of the memory pointer
retraces its steps so that the current memory loci already has something stored
in it, the new item is simply added. Thus memory capacity is unbounded.
Since hypothesis A4 relates to the degree to which awm is limited, we want
to be able to compare the performance of agents who are more or less attention
limited. Thus, all experiments make comparisons between different commu-
nicative strategies over three ranges of of awm settings; the awm search radius
parameter varies from low awm (radius of 3 and 4), to mid awm (radius of
6 and 7) to high awm (radius of 11 and 16). low awm agents are severely
attention limited agents, wherease almost everything an agent knows is salient
for high awm agents.
The limits on awm plays a critical role in determining agents’ performance.
Remember that only salient beliefs can be used in means-end reasoning and
deliberation, so that if the warrant for a proposal is not salient, the agent
cannot properly evaluate a proposal. However, if the agent only knows of one
option, the agent can accept the proposal on the assumption that any option is
better than doing nothing. Section 5 will show the impact of resource limits on
performance. For more detail see [Landauer, 1975, Walker, 1994b].
The implementation of belief deliberation, for the purpose of Design-World
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was tied directly to Landauer’s awm model. In that model, nothing stored
in memory is ever deleted or modified. Rather, new beliefs are added which
effectively compete with beliefs that are already present. Thus an agent’s belief
deliberation process depends on collecting a set of related beliefs which may be
contradictory, and applying an algorithm to determine what the agent believes
(see[Galliers, 1990, Gardenfors, 1990]). The fact that new information about
the the state of the world supercedes old information is an emergent property
of the belief retrieval mechanism: beliefs recently added are more likely to be
retrieved. However the stochastic aspect of retrieval means that it is possible
for an agent to decide to believe “out-of-date” propositions, and “forget” recent
changes in the world. As we will see in section 5, this means that, in cases where
the outdated beliefs were encountered with greater frequency and thus stored
in memory repeatedly, that agents who can access all of their beliefs are more
likely to decide to believe out of date beliefs.15
The plan library contains domain plans for Design-House and its subgoals,
as well as discourse plans for the discourse acts shown in figure 4. The discourse
plans will be discussed in detail in section 4.5.
4.4 Design-World Tasks
The Design-World task as a plan is simple since it involves linear planning of
subgoals which contribute to higher level goals, as shown in figure 6. However,
the task is easily modified according to the general task features discussed above
so that it is more difficult to perform well. These modifications are applicable
to other tasks besides the testbed task, and affect the degree to which different
aspects of the task contribute to the performance evaluation.
There are 4 versions of the task that will be used to test the hypotheses
introduced in section 2: Standard, Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, Matched-Pair,
and Zero-Invalid. The Standard task is inferentially simple, fault tolerant and
requires low levels of belief coordination. The other tasks are more difficult
because they increase the degree of belief coordination required, and magnify
the effect of mistakes. The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs and Matched-Pairs tasks
each explore different aspects of belief coordination and inferential complexity.
The Zero-Invalids task is fault intolerant.
Standard Task The Standard task provides a baseline and is inferentially
simple, fault tolerant and requires low levels of belief co-ordination. The Stan-
dard task is defined so that the quality of solution for a particular dialogue
consists of the sum of all the furniture pieces for each valid step in the plan. In
addition, the task is defined so that partial solutions are possible. Any number
of furniture items in a room is a valid plan, rather than requiring that each
room must have all four furniture items. This choice about task determinacy
makes it possible to see the gradient effect on performance of different resource
restrictions.
In addition the Standard task is fault tolerant. If agents make a mistake
in planning and insert invalid steps in their collaborative plan, the point values
for invalid steps in the plan are simply subtracted from the score. Thus in
the Standard task agents are not heavily penalized for making mistakes due to
inserting steps in plans that are not actually executable.
15It is unclear whether this prediction of the belief deliberation algorithm is consistent with
human performance. However it is easy to think of examples of humans making the kind of
error that this model would predict. For example, I commonly believe (falsely) that I have
eggs at home in the refrigerator, even though I used them the previous evening for quiche.
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Figure 6: Standard Version of the Task, Fault tolerant and Partial Solutions
acceptable.
The Standard task is inferentially simple because the agent’s only inferences
are those by means-end reasoning to generate options, those by deliberation to
evaluate options, and act-effect inferences after committing to an action. Each of
these inferences rely on one premise: the premise (has ?agent ?item) supports
means-end reasoning, the premise (score ?item ?score) supports deliberation,
and the premise (intend A B ?option) supports inferring the effect of ?option.
Thus, none of these processes require multiple premises to be simultaneously
salient. However, it is possible to test hypotheses about processing effort in
the Standard task by making it easier to access these inferential premises. It is
also possible to test the effect of resource limits since these premises must be
accessible to perform optimally on the task.
The degree of belief coordination in the Standard task is low because agents
are only required to coordinate on the intentions corresponding to put-acts
as shown in figure 6. These intentions are always explicitly discussed so that
coordination is always achieved.
The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task
increases the degree of belief coordination by requiring agents to base their
deliberation process on the same beliefs. They must have the same warrants
for adopting an intention in order to do well on this task. Figure 7 shows
the structure of beliefs about intentions and warrants for the Design-House
goal. In the Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task, as shown, the warrants underlying
intentions must also be mutually believed. This is not generally required in
forming a collaborative plan because agents A and B can mutually believe that
they have maximized utility without necessarily agreeing on what that utility
is. Furthermore, in the general case, when agents have only one option under
consideration, they do not need to evaluate the utility of that one option in
order to decide whether to accept or reject it.
The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task provides a basis for testing hypotheses
A1 and A5, introduced in section 2 by increasing the degree of belief coordina-
tion required to perform well on the task, where the beliefs are those used in
deliberation.
The Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task models particular types of real-world
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Figure 7: Tasks can differ as to the level of mutual belief required. Some tasks
require that W, a reason for doing P, is mutually believed and others don’t.
tasks since it is not always necessary for agents to agree on the reasons for car-
rying out a particular action. For example, in the negotiation between the union
and the management of a company, any agreement that is reached is agreed to
by each party for different reasons. An agreement for a shorter work week
is supported by the union because more overtime pay is possible for those who
want to work more and is supported by the management because the company’s
insurance premiums will be lower. However, if two agents agree on a plan, but
have different reasons for doing so, they may change their beliefs and their in-
tentions under different conditions. The most stable, long-term, collaborative
plans will be those in which agents agree on both the actions to be performed,
as well as the reasons for doing those actions. Under these conditions the agents
will be more likely to revise their intentions in a compatible way and intention
revision should be simpler. Thus the Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task examines
one extreme of belief coordination for deliberation.
Matched Pair Tasks Another aspect of belief coordination has to do with
coordinating beliefs based on inferences. There are two task definitions that in-
crease inferential complexity by increasing the number of independent premises
that must be simultaneously available in working memory. These are: (1)
Matched Pair Same Room, and (2) Matched Pair Two Room. Figure 8 shows
the Matched Pair Two Room version of the task. Each intention to put a furni-
ture item in a room can potentially contribute to another intention of achieving
a matched pair goal. A Matched-Pair is two furniture items of the same color.
The inference of a Matched-Pair is based on the minor premises shown in 13:
(13) a. (Intend A B (Put ?agent ?item-1 ?room-1)
b. (Intend A B (Put ?agent ?item-2 ?room-2)
c. (Equal (Color ?item-1) (Color ?item-2))
Making this inference is more demanding for resource limited agents, than
the processing needed in the Standard task. In the standard task, in order to
agree on one step of the plan, the agents must access at least one belief about a
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Figure 8: Making additional Inferences: Matched Pair Two Room Task. Each
PUT intention contributes both to a Design-Room goal as well as a Matched
pair goal
furniture item they have available. In order to properly evaluate the option rep-
resented by that furniture item they must access the warrant for that option.
In contrast, in both Matched Pair tasks, the warrant for both beliefs must be
accessed for both furniture items that could contribute to a Matched-Pair goal.
In addition, the premises in 13 must also be accessed, and furthermore, each
version of the Matched-Pair task requires one additional premise.
The difference in the two Matched Pair tasks is whether the matches are in
the same or different rooms. Matched-Pair Same Room requires the additional
premise that (Equal ?room-1 ?room-2) while Matched Pair Two Room requires
the additional premise that NOT (Equal ?room-1 ?room-2). Because premise
13a is inferred and stored in memory at the time that a proposal is accepted,
and because the agents always complete one room before starting another, the
necessary premise shown in 13a is more likely to be salient in the Matched-Pair-
Same-Room task.
As discussed in sections 1 and 2, we wish to provide a test of hypothesis
A2, the discourse inference constraint, and examine how it affects the coordi-
nation of inference in collaborative planning. Hypotheses A3 and A5 together
imply that the complexity of inference should interact with the agent’s ability
to stay coordinated on inferences. Since our measure of inferential complexity
is the number of independent premises required to draw an inference, both the
Matched-Pair-Same-Room task and the Matched-Pair-Two-Room task increase
inferential complexity.
Evaluating the quality of solution for the Matched-Pair tasks reflects the
emphasis on coordinating on inferences, since both Matched-Pair tasks require
that both agents make the matched pair inferences in order to score points for
matched-pairs. The task measures how well agents are coordinated on the
inferred intentions that follow from the intentions that were explicitly agreed
upon. Only the intentions that contribute to Matched-Pairs are counted in the
final solution, and the utility of these intentions is the sum of the utilities of the
two furniture items, plus the utility of the Matched-Pair (50 points).
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Figure 9: In Zero Invalids Task, invalid steps invalidate the whole plan.
Zero-Invalids Task The Zero-Invalids task is fault intolerant (see figure 9)
The assumption in the Zero Invalids Task is that any mistake invalidates the
whole plan. This is a feature of task determinacy: while there are still many
possible 8 step plans, all of the solutions with less than 8 items that would be
counted as valid solutions for the Standard Task are not valid solutions for the
Zero Invalids Task.
This task is an example of one extreme of fault intolerance. In general, how
fault tolerant a task is depends on the interdependency of different subparts of
the problem solution. For some tasks, a mistake can invalidate the whole solu-
tion, for other tasks, partial solutions without the invalid step may be adequate.
For example, in a task like furnishing a room it may be desirable to have both
a couch and a chair, but if the agents make a mistake and assume they can use
a chair that will end up in a different room, the room is still partially furnished
and usable. On the other hand, in a task such as building a tower, each step
depends on the successful execution of the previous step and the whole plan
may be invalid if a step to put down a foundation block cannot be executed.
Note that an agent can reject another agent’s proposal based on believing
that it would add an invalid step to the plan, as shown in the rejection utterance
act schema in section 3.2. Since agents have to agree on each step of the plan,
an invalid step can only be inserted into the plan if both agents have failed to
remember that the preconditions for the plan do not hold.
4.5 Varying Communicative Strategies
Section 3 discussed the discourse act schema that controls how agents participate
in dialogue, and discussed the types of utterance acts that the discourse acts are
composed of. Which utterance acts a discourse act decomposes into depends on
communicative strategies which codify different communicative choices for
how to do a particular discourse action. Agents are parameterized for different
communicative strategies by placing different expansions of discourse plans in
their plan libraries.
Varying an agent’s communicative strategies provides the basis for testing
the hypotheses about the potential benefits of IRUs. Varying the degree of ex-
plicitness of a discourse act is the basis of the four communicative strategies
tested below: (1) All-Implicit; (2) Close-Consequence; (3) Explicit-Warrant;
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and (4) Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit. All of these strategies are hypothe-
sized to mitigate agents’ attentional and inferential resource limits, under the
assumptions about their architecture and the definition of quality of solution
for the task.
Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13 show a plan operator for each strategy. These op-
erators draw on work by Walker and Rambow [Walker and Rambow, 1994], and
also make use of Moser and Moore’s definitions of discourse acts and the integra-
tion of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) and Grosz and Sidner’s theory of dis-
course [Mann and Thompson, 1987, Grosz and Sidner, 1986, Moser and Moore, 1993,
Moser and Moore, 1995]. The predicates in the plan operators are precisely de-
fined by the collaborative planning model and agent architecture discussed in
section 3. Each discourse act such as a proposal, is composed of a core act
which represents the primary purpose of the act such as a propose utterance act,
as well as a contributor act, such as a warrant, whose purpose is to increase
the likelihood of achieving the intention of the core [Moore and Paris, 1993,
Young et al., 1994, Young and Moore, 1994].
name: Proposal-All-Implicit (?speaker, ?hearer, ?act)
effect: (desire ?hearer (do ?hearer ?act) ?utility-act)
constraints: (and (option ?act)
(salient ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act)))
core: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act)
Figure 10: The Proposal plan operator for an All-Implicit Agent
All-Implicit Strategy The All-Implicit strategy is an expansion of a dis-
course plan to make a proposal, in which a proposal decomposes trivially
to the communicative act of propose. See the plan-operator in figure 10. This
strategy is the communicative choice shown in 3 in section 1, and provides a
baseline strategy that is consistent with the redundancy constraint. The
experiments below will compare the performance of agents using the All-Implicit
strategy with the performance of agents using the other proposal strategies dis-
cussed below.
In dialogue 12 on page 22, both Design-World agents communicate using the
All-Implicit strategy, and the proposals are shown in utterances 1, 2, and 3. As
figure 10 shows, the All-Implicit strategy includes no additional information in
proposals, leaving it up to the other agent to retrieve them from memory.
The constraints on using the All-Implicit strategy are that (1) the proposed
?act is an option generated by means-end reasoning and (2) that the utility is
salient to the hearer. In the experiments below, agents are parameterized to
use this strategy consistently, so that an agent using the All-Implicit strategy
assumes everything the hearer knows is always salient. The effect of the proposal
is that the hearer will evaluate that proposal and deliberate the degree to which
the hearer desires the act. However, whether the hearer will accept or reject
the proposal depends on other options the hearer knows about. Clearly the
speaker cannot predict these other options. Thus the effect of the proposal does
not specify that the action will be intended by the hearer. This holds for all
proposal operators.
The All-Implicit strategy can be used by agents in any of the Design-World
tasks discussed in section 4.4, since the agents are capable of making inferences
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or accessing memory to fill in what has been left implicit with this strategy.
Other inferences drawn by the hearer from the proposal utterance act are not
shown in figure 10. For example, an agent can use the All-Implicit strategy in
either of the Matched-Pair tasks, leaving it up to the other agent to infer which
other intention makes a match with the option currently under consideration.
name: Close-Consequence (?speaker,?hearer,?act)
effect: (and (salient ?hearer (effect ?act ?effect))
(bel ?hearer (closed-segment ?act)))
constraints: (and (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act)
(open-segment ?act))
contributor: (say ?speaker ?hearer (effect ?act ?effect))
core: (close ?speaker ?hearer ?act))
Figure 11: The Closing plan operator for a Close-Consequence Agent
Close Consequence In dialogue 14, agent CLC uses the Close-Consequence
strategy. The plan-operator for this strategy is shown in figure 11. The core
of the strategy is explicit closing statements, such as 14-2, on the completion
of the intention associated with a discourse segment. A contributor to CLC’s
closing discourse act is an IRU such as 14-3: CLC makes the inference explicit
that since they have agreed on putting the green rug in the study, they no longer
have the green rug (act-effect inference).
(14) 1: BILL: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-clc option-30: put-act (agent-bill green rug room-
1))
2: CLC: So, we’ve agreed to put the green rug in the study.
(close agent-clc agent-bill intended-30: put-act (agent-bill green rug room-
1))
3: CLC: And we no longer have green rug.
(say agent-clc agent-bill bel-48: hasn’t (agent-bill green rug))
The Close-Consequence strategy of making inferences explicit at the close
of a segment models the naturally occurring example in 8. In both cases an
inference is made explicit that follows from what has just been said, and the in-
ference is sequentially located at the close of a discourse segment. This strategy
can be used by agents in any of the Design-World tasks discussed in section 4.4.
The Close-Consequence strategy will be used to test hypothesis C2 about
potential benefits of making inferences explicit, and will be contrasted with the
All-Implicit strategy where no closing acts are produced. Note in dialogue 12
on page 22 that both the agents go on to the next phase of the plan, leaving
the inference of both Acceptance and Closing for the other agent to make.
However, Close-Consequence is not a good test of other hypotheses because
in the experiments both agents always make act-effect inferences, and these
inferences are not difficult to make. See [Walker, 1995b] for a discussion of
experiments which vary an agent’s capability to make these inferences.
Explicit Warrant The Explicit-Warrant strategy varies the proposal dis-
course act by including warrant IRUs in each proposal. The plan operator
is given in figure 12 and exemplified by the dialogue excerpt in 15. Remember
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name: Proposal-Explicit-Warrant (?speaker, ?hearer, ?act)
effect: (and (desire ?hearer (do ?hearer ?act) ?utility-act)
(salient ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act)))
constraints: (and (option ?act)
(not-salient ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act)))
contributor: (say ?speaker ?hearer (utility ?act ?utility-act))
core: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act)
Figure 12: The Proposal plan operator for an Explicit-Warrant Agent
that a warrant for an intention is a reason for adopting the intention, and
here warrants are the score propositions that give the utility of the proposal,
which are mutually believed at the outset of the dialogues. In 15, the warrant
IRU in 15-1 contributes to the proposal (core act) in 15-2.
(15) 1: IEI: Putting in the green rug is worth 56
(say agent-iei agent-iei2 bel-2: score (option-2: put-act (agent-iei green rug
room-1) 56))
2: IEI: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-iei agent-iei2 option-2: put-act (agent-iei green rug room-1))
The plan operator in figure 12 specifies that an effect of using this plan is that
the utility of the proposal option is salient. Since warrants are used by the other
agent in deliberation, the Explicit-Warrant strategy can save the other agent the
processing involved with determining which facts are relevant for deliberation
and retrieving them from memory. A constraint on using the Explicit-Warrant
plan operator is that the utility of the proposal act is not already salient.
In the experiments below, agents are parameterized to use this strategy con-
sistently, with the result that an agent using the Explicit-Warrant strategy as-
sumes that the warrant is never salient for the hearer. See [Jordan and Walker, 1995]
for experiments in which an agent attempts to maintain a dynamic model of
what is salient for the other agent. The Explicit-Warrant strategy also occurs
in natural dialogues as shown in the naturally occurring example in dialogue
9b.
This strategy can be used by agents in any of the Design-World tasks dis-
cussed in section 4.4. The Explicit Warrant strategy provides a test of hypothe-
sis A1: agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes of deliberating
beliefs and intentions. It can also be used to test hypothesis A4: the choice
to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to which an agent is re-
source limited in attentional capacity. In the Standard task this is predicted to
improve the performance of resource limited agents. In the Zero-NonMatching
beliefs task this strategy should increase the likelihood that agents coordinate
their beliefs about the warrants underlying different plan steps.
TheMatched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy The Matched-Pair-Inference-
Explicit strategy expands the proposal discourse act to two communicative
acts. See figure 13. The contributor of the proposal consists of statement about
what is already intended, while the core is a propose utterance act, as in 16-6
followed by 16-7 in one turn:16
16The names of agents who use the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy are a numbered
version of the string “IMI” which stands for Implicit acceptance, Match Inference.
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name: Proposal-Matched-Pair (?speaker, ?hearer, ?act1)
effect: (and (desire ?hearer (do ?hearer ?act1) ?utility-act)
(salient ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act2)))
constraints: (and (option ?act1)
(matched-pair ?act1 ?act2)
(salient ?hearer (utility ?act1 ?utility-act)))
(not (salient ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act2)))
contributor: (say ?speaker ?hearer (intend ?speaker ?hearer ?act2))
core: (propose ?speaker ?hearer ?act1)
Figure 13: The Proposal plan operator for an Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
Agent
(16) 6: IMI2: We agreed to put the purple couch in the study.
(say agent-imi2 agent-imi intended-51: put-act (agent-imi2 purple couch
room-1))
7: IMI2: Then, let’s put the purple rug in the living room.
(propose agent-imi2 agent-imi option-80: put-act (agent-imi2 purple rug
room-2))
The statement in 16-6 is an IRU, because it realizes information previously
inferred by both agents, and models the IRU in dialogue 11. Matched-Pair-
Inference-Explicit is the variation discussed in section 1 in choice 4. This strat-
egy is only intended to be used in the Matched-Pair tasks as a way of testing
hypothesis A2, the discourse inference constraint. As figure 13 shows, a con-
straint on using this plan is that the speaking agent has inferred a Matched-Pair
for the option being proposed.
Although this strategy is specifically tied to Matched-Pair inferences, it pro-
vides a test of a general strategy for making premises for inferences salient, in
tasks that are inferentially complex, and which also require agents to remain co-
ordinated on inferences. For example, to generalize this strategy to other cases
of plan-related inferences, the clauses for (Matched-Pair ?act1 ?act2) could be
replaced with the more general (Generates ?act1 ∧ ?act2 ?act3), where the
generates relation is to be inferred [Pollack, 1986, Di Eugenio, 1993].
Note that the effect of using this strategy is not that the hearer makes
the matched pair inference, rather the effect is that the premise for the desired
inference is salient. A constraint on using this strategy is that this premise is not
already salient. However, agents parameterized with this strategy always assume
that the premise is not salient for the hearer. See [Jordan and Walker, 1995] for
experiments in which agents attempt to maintain a dynamic model of the other
agent’s attentional state.
4.6 Plan Evaluation
Section 3.3 specified a model of how collaborative plans are evaluated in terms
of quality of solution and collaborative effort. Design-World is con-
structed in order to be able to measure the quality of a solution as well as
collaborative effort. Section 4.4 defined quality of solution for all of the Design-
World tasks. We want to examine trade-offs in performance between strategy
choices.
It is obvious that these trade-offs can be related to the relative contributions
of total cost of communication versus the total cost of inference versus the total
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Figure 14: Performance Distributions showing the effect of awm parameteriza-
tion for dialogues between two All-Implicit Agents when all processing is free.
The three performance distributions are for low, mid and high awm agents.
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Figure 15: Performance distributions showing the effect of increased retrieval
cost for each awm range for dialogues between two All-Implicit Agents. The
three performance distributions are for low, mid and high awm agents. retcost
= .001
cost of retrieval for both agents’ collaborative effort. Thus, to calculate collab-
orative effort, we cannot simply add up the number of retrievals, inferences and
messages. Consider that a Consequence IRU that makes an inference explicit
ensures that an inferred belief becomes part of the discourse model. However,
if the inference would have been made anyway, the benefit of the strategy is de-
pendent upon whether the effort to make the inference without the consequence
IRU would have been greater than the cost of processing the extra utterance
of the Consequence IRU. A similar argument holds for the potential benefit
of Attention IRUs. Whenever an Attention IRU reduces overall effort for re-
trieval while not increasing communication effort to the same degree, it will be
beneficial. This hypothesis is given below in a general form.
HYPOTH-I1: Strategies that reduce collaborative effort without af-
fecting quality of solution are beneficial.
This hypothesis follows directly from the definition of performance repeated
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here for convenience from section 3.3:
performance = quality of solution – collaborative ef-
fort
We need to introduce parameters for the effort involved with each of the
component processes because they are not strictly comparable, and because
these modules are implementation dependent. Thus agents’ retrieval, inference
and communicative costs are parameterized by (1) commcost: cost of sending
a message; (2) infcost: cost of inference; and (3) retcost: cost of retrieval
from memory. Collaborative effort is then defined as:
collaborative effort =
(commcost × total messages for both agents)
+ (infcost × total inferences for both agents)
+ (retcost × total retrievals for both agents)
We will use these cost parameters to explore three extremes in this space:
(1) when processing is free; (2) when retrieval effort dominates other processing
costs; and (3) when communication effort dominates other processing costs. The
parameters support modeling various instantiations of the agent architecture
given in figure 3. For example, varying the cost of retrieval models different
assumptions about how the beliefs database, plan library and working memory
are implemented. Varying the cost of communication models situations in which
communication planning is very costly. The relation between the values of these
parameters and the utilities of the steps in the plan determines experimental
outcomes, rather than the absolute values.
As an example of the effect of varying these costs, consider the plots of
performance distributions shown in figures 14 and 15 for low, mid and high
awm. In these figures, performance is plotted on the x-axis and number of
simulations at that performance level are given by bars on the y-axis. The
performance distributions in figure 14 demonstrate the increase in quality of
solution that we would expect with increases in awm, given no processing
costs.17 Figure 15 shows what happens when processing is not free: here a
retrieval cost of .001 means that every memory access reduces quality of solution
by 1/1000 of a point (remember that the utilities of plan steps range between 10
and 56). As figure 15 shows, the ability to access the whole beliefs database in
reasoning does not always improve performance since high awm agents perform
similarly to mid awm agents.
4.7 Summary: Mapping from Naturally Occurring Data
to Design World Experiments
Section 2 proposed hypotheses about the function of IRUs in human to human
collaborative planning dialogues, and then section 3 presented a model for col-
laborative planning dialogues based on the observations in section 2. Section 4
then described Design-World as a testbed of the model, and sections 4.4 and 4.5
introduced a number of parameters of the testbed that are intended to model
17These distributions approximate Beta distributions [Wilks, 1962], and this approximation
was used to determine that 200 runs would guarantee stable results. The Beta distribution
with the largest variance, for parameters R and S greater than or equal to 1, is the uniform
distribution. This largest variance distribution would require approximately 133 samples
[Siegel, 1956, Wilks, 1962]. An empirical evaluation of the adequacy of this sample size for
three different strategies was tested to see if any differences showed up in alternate runs of
100; no differences were found.
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the features of the human-human dialogues and support testing of the hypothe-
ses. Here I wish to summarize the mapping between the naturally occurring
dialogues and the design of the testbed in order to clarify the basis for the
experiments in the next section.
The testbed and the experimental parameters are based on the following
mapping between human-human collaborative planning dialogues and the testbed.
First, the planning and deliberation aspects of human processing are modeled
with the IRMA architecture, and resource limits on these processes are mod-
eled by extending the IRMA architecture with a model of Attention/Working
Memory (awm) which has been shown to model a limited but critical set of
properties of human processing. Second, the processing of dialogue is tied to
the agent architecture. Third, the mapping of a warrant relation between an
act and a belief in naturally occurring examples such as 9b is modeled with a
warrant relation between an act and a belief in Design-World as seen in the
Explicit-Warrant communication strategy in section 4.5. Fourth, the mapping
assumes that arbitrary content based inferences in natural dialogues such as that
discussed in relation to example 11 can be mapped to content based inferences
in Design-World such as those required for doing well on the Matched-Pair
tasks. Fifth, the mapping is based on the assumption that task difficulty in
naturally occurring tasks such as those in the financial advice domain can be
related to three abstract features: (1) inferential complexity as measured by
the number of premise required for making an inferences; (2) degree of belief
coordination required on intentions, inferences and beliefs underlying a plan;
and (3) task determinacy and fault tolerance. Finally the mapping assumes
that it is reasonable to evaluate the performance of the agents in collaborative
planning dialogues by using domain plan utility for a measure of the quality of
solution and defining the cost to achieve that solution as collaborative effort,
appropriately parameterized.
The details of this mapping specifies how the testbed implements the model
of collaborative planning and provides the basis for extrapolating from the
testbed experimental results to the human-human dialogues that are being mod-
eled. The testbed provides an excellent environment for testing the hypotheses
to the extent that the model captures critical aspects of human-human dia-
logues.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Statistically Evaluating Performance
The experiments examine the interaction between tasks, communication strate-
gies and awm resource limits. Every experiment varies awm over three ranges:
low, mid, and high. In order to run an experiment on a particular commu-
nicative strategy for a particular task, 200 dialogues for each awm range are
simulated. Because the awm model is probabilistic, each dialogue simulation
has a different result. The awm parameter yields a performance distribution for
very resource limited agents (low), agents hypothesized to be similar to human
agents (mid), and resource unlimited agents (high). Sample performance dis-
tributions for quality of solution (with no collaborative effort subtracted)
from runs of two All-Implicit agents for each awm setting are shown in figure
14.
To test our hypotheses, we want to compare the performance of two differ-
ent communicative strategies for a particular task, under different asssumptions
about resource limits and processing costs. To see the effect of communicative
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strategy and awm over the whole range of awm settings, we first run a two-way
analysis of variance (anova) with awm as one factor and communication strat-
egy as another.18 The anova tells us whether: (1) awm alone is a significant
factor in predicting performance; (2) communication strategy alone is a signif-
icant factor in predicting performance; and (3) whether there is an interaction
between communication strategy and awm.
However, anova alone does not enable us to determine the particular awm
range at which a communication strategy aids or hinders performance, and
many of the hypotheses about the benefits of particular communication strate-
gies are specific to how resource limited an agent is. Furthermore, whenever
strategy affects performance positively for one value of awm and negatively
for another value of awm, the potential effects of strategy cannot be seen
from the anova alone. Therefore, we conduct planned comparisons of strate-
gies using the modified Bonferroni test (hereafter MB) [Keppel, 1982], within
each awm range setting to determine which awm range the strategy affects
[Cohen, 1995, Keppel, 1982].19 On the basis of these comparisons we can say
whether a strategy is beneficial for a particular task for a particular awm
range.
A strategy A is beneficial as compared to a strategy B, for a
particular awm range, in the same task situation, with the same
cost settings, if the mean of A is significantly greater than the mean
of B, according to the modified Bonferroni test (MB) test.
The converse of beneficial is detrimental:
A strategy A is detrimental as compared to a strategy B, for a
particular awm range, in the same task situation, with the same cost
settings, if the mean of A is significantly less than the mean of B,
according to the modified Bonferroni test (MB) test.
Strategies need not be either beneficial or detrimental, there may be
no difference between two strategies. Also with the definition given above a
strategy may be both beneficial and detrimental depending on the range
of awm that the two strategies are compared over, i.e. A strategy may be
beneficial for low awm agents and detrimental for high awm agents.
A difference plot such as that in figure 16 is used to summarize a com-
parison of two strategies, strategy 1 and strategy 2. In the comparisons below,
strategy 1 is either Close-Consequence,20 Explicit-Warrant, or Matched-Pair-
Inference-Explicit and strategy 2 is the All-Implicit strategy. Differences in
performance means between two strategies are plotted on the Y-axis against
awm ranges on the X-axis. Each point in the plot represents the difference in
the means of 200 runs of each strategy at a particular awm range. These plots
summarize the information from 1200 simulated dialogues.
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Figure 16: If Processing is Free, Explicit-Warrant is neither beneficial nor detri-
mental for all awm settings: Strategy 1 of two Explicit-Warrant agents and
strategy 2 of two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost = 0, infcost
= 0, retcost = 0
cost - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 1 , I = 1 , R = 0.01
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Figure 17: Explicit-Warrant is beneficial for mid and high awm agents when
Retrieval dominates processing costs: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents
and strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost = 1,
infcost = 1, retcost = .01
5.2 Standard Task
Remember that the Standard task is defined so that the quality of solution
that agents achieve for a design-house plan, constructed via the dialogue, is
18The experimental performance distributions are not normal and the variance is not the37
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Figure 18: Explicit-Warrant is detrimental for low and high awm agents when
communication effort is high: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and
strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost = 10, infcost
= 0, retcost = 0
the sum of the utilities of each valid step in their plan. The task has multiple
correct solutions and is fault tolerant because the point values for invalid steps
in the plan are simply subtracted from the score, with the effect that agents
are not heavily penalized for making mistakes. Furthermore, the task has low
inferential complexity: the only inferences agents are required to make are those
for deliberation and means-end reasoning. In both of these cases, to make these
inferences, agents are only required to access a single minor premise
All-Implicit agents do fairly well at the Standard task, under assumptions
that all processing is free, as shown in the performance plot in figure 14. How-
ever, as retrieval costs increase, high awm agents don’t do as well as when
retrieval is free, because they expend too much effort on retrieval during collab-
orative planning. Compare the high awm distribution in figure 14 with that in
figure 15. Thus for the Standard task, high awm agents have the potential to
benefit from communication strategies that reduce the total effort for retrieval,
when retrieval is not free. In addition, although the task has minimal inferential
complexity, easy access to information that is used for deliberation, which the
Explicit-Warrant strategy provides, could benefit low awm agents, since they
might otherwise make nonoptimal decisions. Furthermore, although the task is
fault tolerant, agents are still penalized for making errors since errors do not con-
same over different samples, however anova is robust against the violation of these assumptions
under the conditions in these experiments [Cohen, 1995, Keppel, 1982].
19According to the modified Bonferroni test, the significant F values for the planned com-
parisons reported below are 3.88 for a p < .05, 5.06 for a p < .025, 6.66 for a p < .01, and
9.61 for a p < .002.
20In experiments with Close-Consequence only one agent in a dialogue uses the Close-
Consequence strategy because the use of this strategy is constrained to when the dialogue
segment is open. See figure 11. Since only one agent will ever produce a closing statement for
any dialogue segment, only one agent is given the option in the simulations.
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tribute to performance. Thus for the Standard task, communication strategies
such as Close-Consequence that can reduce the number of errors could be bene-
ficial. Below we will compare the All-Implicit strategy to the Explicit-Warrant
strategy and the Close-Consequence strategy.
Explicit-Warrant The Explicit-Warrant strategy can be used in the Stan-
dard task to test hypothesis A1: agents produce Attention IRUs to support the
processes of deliberating beliefs and intentions. It can also be used to test hy-
pothesis A4: the choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the degree to
which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity. Thus one prediction
is that the Explicit-Warrant strategy will result in higher performance for low
awm agents even when processing is free by ensuring that they can access the
warrant and use it in deliberation, thus making better decisions.
Figure 16 plots the differences in the performance means between the Explicit-
Warrant strategy and the All-Implicit strategy for low, mid and high awm
agents. A two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and the Explicit-Warrant
strategy for the Standard task shows that awm has a large effect on perfor-
mance (F= 336.63, p< .000001). There is no main effect for communicative
strategy (F = 1.92, p < 0.16). However, there is an interaction between awm
and communicative choice (F=1136.34, p< .000001).
By comparing performance within a particular awm range for each strat-
egy we can see which awm settings interact with communicative strategy. The
planned comparisons using the Modified Bonferonni (mb) test show that the
Explicit-Warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental in the Stan-
dard task, in comparison with the All-Implicit strategy, if all processing is free
(mb(low) = 0.29, ns; mb(mid) = 2.79, ns; mb(high) = 0.39, ns). Note that
there is a trend towards the Explicit-Warrant strategy being detrimental at mid
awm.
The hypothesis based on the corpus analysis was that low awm agents
might benefit from communicative strategies that include IRUs. However, this
hypothesis is disconfirmed. Further analysis of this result suggests a hypothe-
sis not apparent from the corpus analysis: any beneficial effect of an IRU can
be cancelled for resource limited agents because IRUs may displace other in-
formation from working memory that is more useful. In this case, despite the
fact that the warrant information is useful for deliberation, making the warrant
salient displaces information that can be used to generate other options. When
agents are very resource-limited making an optimal decision is not as important
as being able to generate multiple options.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy can also be used in the Standard task to
test hypothesis I1: strategies that reduce collaborative effort overall may be
beneficial. Thus, another prediction is that by providing the warrant used in
deliberating a proposal with every proposal, the Explicit-Warrant strategy has
the potential to reduce resource consumption when accessing memory has some
processing cost.
Figure 17 plots the differences in the performance means between the Explicit-
Warrant strategy and the All-Implicit strategy for low, mid and high awm
agents when retrieval effort dominates processing. A two-way anova explor-
ing the effect of awm and the Explicit-Warrant strategy for the Standard task,
when retrieval cost dominates processing, shows that awm has a large effect on
performance (F= 330.15, p< .000001). There is also a main effect for commu-
nicative strategy (F = 5.74, p < 0.01), and an interaction between awm and
communicative choice (F= 1077.64, p< .000001).
The planned comparisons using the MB test to compare performance at each
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awm range show that, in the Standard task, in comparison with the All-Implicit
strategy, the Explicit-Warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental for
low awm agents (mb(low) = 0.27, ns). However, hypothesis I1 is confirmed
because the Explicit-Warrant strategy is beneficial for mid awm agents mb(mid)
= 86.43, p< .002. The Explicit-Warrant strategy also tends towards improving
performance for high awm agents mb(high) = 2.07, p < .10). For higher awm
values, this trend is because the beliefs necessary for deliberating the proposal
are made available in the current context with each proposal, so that agents
don’t have to search memory for them.
As an additional test of hypothesis I1, a final experiment tests the Explicit-
Warrant strategy against the All-Implicit strategy in a situation where the cost
of communication dominates other processing costs. Figure 18 plots the differ-
ences in the performance means between the Explicit-Warrant strategy and the
All-Implicit strategy for low, mid and high awm agents when communication
effort dominates processing. A two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and
the Explicit-Warrant strategy for the Standard task, when communication effort
dominates processing, shows that awm has a large effect on performance (F=
409.52, p< .000001). There is also a main effect for communicative strategy (F
= 28.12, p < 0.000001), and an interaction between awm and communicative
choice (F= 960.24, p< .000001).
The planned comparisons using the MB test to compare performance at each
awm range show that in this situation, when communication effort dominates
processing, the Explicit-Warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental
for mid awm agents (mb(mid) = 0.12, ns. However, the Explicit-Warrant strat-
egy is detrimental for both low and high awm agents, mb(low) = 7.69, p<
.01; mb(high) = 39.65, p < .01). Since this strategy includes an extra utterance
with every proposal and provides no clear benefits, it is detrimental to perfor-
mance in the Standard task when communication effort dominates processing.
Below, when we compare this situation with that in the Zero-NonMatching-
Beliefs task, we will see that this is due to the fact that the Standard task has
low coordination requirements.
Close-Consequence The Close-Consequence strategy of making inferences
explicit can be used in the Standard task to test hypothesis C4: the choice
to produce a Consequence IRU is related to a measure of ‘how important’ the
inference is. Even though the Standard task is fault tolerant, every invalid step
reduces the quality of solution of the final plan. Making act-effect inferences
explicit decreases the likelihood of making this kind of error.
The difference plot in figure 19 plots performance differences between the
Close-Consequence strategy and the All-Implicit strategy, in the Standard task,
when all processing is free. A two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and
the Close-Consequence strategy in this situation shows that awm has a large
effect on performance (F= 249.20, p< .000001), and that there is an interaction
between awm and communicative choice (F= 919.27, p< .000001).
Planned comparisons between strategies for each awm range shows that the
Close-Consequence strategy is detrimental in comparison with All-Implicit for
low awm agents (mb(low) = 8.70, p < .01). This is because generating op-
tions contributes more to performance for agents with low awm than avoiding
errors, and the additional utterances that make inferences explicit in the Close-
Consequence strategy has the effect of displacing facts that could be used in
means end reasoning to generate options. There is no difference in performance
for mid awm agents (mb(mid) = .439, ns).
However, comparisons between the two strategies for high awm agents
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Figure 19: Close-Consequence can be detrimental in the Standard Task for low
awm agents and beneficial for high awm agents. Strategy 1 is the combination
of an All-Implicit agent with a Close-Consequence agent and Strategy 2 is two
All-Implicit agents, Task = Standard, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
shows that the Close-Consequence strategy is beneficial in comparison with
All-Implicit (mb(high) = 171.71, p < .002). See figure 19. This is because
the belief deliberation algorithm increases the probability of high awm agents
choosing to believe out of date beliefs about the state of the world. The result
is that they are more likely to have invalid steps in their plans. Thus the Close-
Consequence strategy is beneficial because reinforcing the belief that a furniture
item has been used makes it less likely that agents will believe that they still
have that furniture item. This result is not predicted by any hypotheses, but
as discussed in section 4.3, this property of the belief deliberation mechanism
has some intuitive appeal. In any case, this result provides a data point for
the benefit of a strategy for making inferences explicit when the probability of
making an error increases if that inference is not made.
5.3 Zero NonMatching Beliefs Task
Remember that the Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task requires a greater degree
of belief coordination by requiring agents to agree on the beliefs underlying
deliberation (warrants).21 Thus, it it increases the importance of making
particular deliberation-based inferences, and can therefore be used to test hy-
potheses A1, A4 and A5. Below we will compare the performance of agents
using the All-Implicit strategy with the Explicit-Warrant strategy in the Zero-
NonMatching-Beliefs task.
Figure 20 plots the mean performance differences of the Explicit-Warrant
21Remember that in other tasks, agents do not have to agree on warrants because in
situations in which they know of only one option, they do not need to retrieve the warrant in
order to be able to decide to accept the proposal. Thus when agents have limited awm, they
may accept a proposal without having retrieved the warrant.
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Figure 20: Explicit-Warrant is beneficial for Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs Task for
low and mid awm agents: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strat-
egy 2 is two All-Implicit agents: Task = Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, commcost
= 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
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Figure 21: Explicit-Warrant is beneficial for Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs Task, for
low andmid awm agents, even when communication cost dominates processing:
Strategy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strategy 2 is two All-Implicit
agents: Task = Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, commcost = 10, infcost = 0, retcost
= 0
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strategy and the All-Implicit strategy in the Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs task. A
two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and communicative strategy for the
Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs task, shows that awm has a large effect on perfor-
mance (F= 471.42, p< .000001). There is also a main effect for communicative
strategy (F = 379.74, p < 0.000001), and an interaction between awm and
communicative choice (F= 669.24, p< .000001).
Comparisons within each awm range of the two communicative strategies in
this task shows that the Explicit-Warrant strategy is highly beneficial for low
and mid awm agents (mb(low) = 260.6, p < 0.002; mb(mid) = 195.5, p <
0.002). The strategy is also beneficial for high awm agents mb(high) = 4.48,
p < 0.05). When agents are resource limited, they may fail to access a warrant.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy guarantees that the agents always can access the
warrant for the option under discussion. Thus, even agents with higher values
of awm can benefit from this strategy, since the task requires such a high degree
of belief coordination.
Hypothesis I1 can also be tested in this task. We can ask whether it is
possible to drive the total effort for communication high enough to make it
inefficient to choose the Explicit-Warrant strategy over All-Implicit. However,
the benefits of the Explicit-Warrant strategy for low and mid awm agents for
this task are so strong that they cannot be reduced even when communication
cost is high (mb(low) = 246.4, p < 0.002; mb(mid) = 242.7, p < 0.002). See
figure 21. In other words, even when every extra warrant message increases
collaborative effort by 10 and reduces performance by 10, if the task is Zero-
NonMatching-Beliefs, resource-limited agents using Explicit-Warrant do better.
Contrast figure 21 with the Standard task and same cost parameters in figure
18.
However, when communication cost is high, the strategy becomes detrimen-
tal for high awm agents (mb(high) = 7.56, p < 0.01). These agents can
usually access warrants and the increase in belief coordination afforded by the
Explicit-Warrant strategy does not offset the high communication cost.
5.4 Inferential Tasks: Matched pairs
The two versions of the Matched-Pair tasks described in section 4.4 (1) increase
the inferential complexity of the task and (2) increase the degree of belief coor-
dination required by requiring agents to be coordinated on inferences that follow
from intentions that have been explicitly agreed upon. Both tasks increases in-
ferential difficulty to a small degree: All-Implicit agents do fairly well at making
matched pair inferences. The Matched-Pair-Same-Room task requires the same
inferences as the Matched-Pair-Two-Room task, but these inferences should be
easier to make in the Matched-Pair-Same-Room since the inferential premises
are more likely to be salient.
The Matched-Pair tasks provide an environment for testing hypotheses A2,
A3, A4 and A5. The Attention strategy that is used to test these hypotheses is
the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy; this strategy makes the premises
for matched-pair inferences salient, thus increasing the likelihood of agents mak-
ing matched-pair inferences. The predictions are that this strategy should be
beneficial for low and possibly for mid awm agents, but that high awm agents
can access the necessary inferential premises without Attention IRUs. Further-
more, we predict that the beneficial effect should be stronger for the Matched-
Pair-Two-Room task.
Figure 22 plots the performance differences between All-Implicit agents and
Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit agents for the Matched-Pair-Same-Room task.
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Figure 22: Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit is beneficial for low awm agents in
Matched-Pair-Same-Room. Strategy 1 is two Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
agents and Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task = Matched-Pair-Same-
Room, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
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Figure 23: Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit is beneficial for low, mid and high
awm agents in the Matched-Pair-Two-Room Task. Strategy 1 is two Matched-
Pair-Inference-Explicit agents and Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task =
Matched-Pair-Two-Room, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
A two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and communicative strategy in
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Figure 24: The Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy is beneficial for low,
mid and high awm agents in the Matched-Pair-Two-Room Task even with
communication cost of 10. Strategy 1 is two Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
agents and Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task = Matched-Pair-Two-
Room, commcost = 10, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
this task, shows that awm has a large effect on performance (F= 323.93, p<
.000001). There is no main effect for communicative strategy (F = .03, ns), but
there is an interaction between awm and communicative choice (F= 1101.51,
p< .000001).
Comparisons within awm ranges between agents using the All-Implicit strat-
egy and agents using the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy in the Matched-
Pair-Same-Room task (figure 22) shows that Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
strategy is beneficial for low awm agents (mb(low) = 4.47, p < .05), but not
significantly different for either mid or high awm agents). In the Matched-Pair-
Same-Room task the content of the IRU was recently inferred and is likely to
still be salient, thus the beneficial effect is relatively small and is restricted to
very resource limited agents.
In contrast, in the Matched-Pair-Two-Room task, the effect on performance
of the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy is much larger, as we predicted.
Figure 23 plots the mean performance differences of agents using the Matched-
Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy and those using the All-Implicit strategy. The
All-Implicit agents do not manage to achieve the same levels of mutual inference
as Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit agents. A two-way anova exploring the effect
of awm and communicative strategy in this task, shows that awm has a large
effect on performance (F= 171.79, p< .000001). There is a main effect for
communicative strategy (F = 57.12, p < .001), and an interaction between
awm and communicative choice (F= 567.34, p< .000001).
Comparisons within awm ranges between agents using the All-Implicit strat-
egy and agents using the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy in the Matched-
Pair-Two-Room task (figure 23) shows that Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
strategy is beneficial for low, mid and high awm agents (mb(low) = 21.94, p
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< .01); mb(mid) = 7.71, p < .01); mb(high) = 38.85, p < .002). In other words,
this strategy is highly effective in increasing the ability of low, mid and high
awm agents to make matched pair inferences in the Matched-Pair-Two-Room
task.
We predicted the strategy to be beneficial for low and possibly for mid awm
agents because it gives agents access to premises for inferences which they would
otherwise be unable to access. This confirms the effect of the hypothesized
discourse inference constraint. However, we did not expect it to be
beneficial for high awm agents. This surprising effect is due to the fact that,
in the case of higher awm values, the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy
keeps the agents coordinated on which inference the proposing agent intended
in a situation in which multiple inferences are possible. In other words, when
agents have high awm they can make divergent inferences, and a strategy
of making inferential premises salient improves agents’ inferential coordination.
Thus the strategy controls inferential processes in a way that was not predicted
based on the corpus analysis alone.
Hypothesis I1 can also be tested in this task. We can ask whether it is
possible to drive the effort for communication high enough to make it inefficient
to choose the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy over All-Implicit.
Figure 24 plots the mean performance differences between these two strate-
gies when communication cost is high. Comparisons within each awm range
shows that this strategy is still beneficial for low, mid and high awm agents
even with a high communication cost (mb(low) = 19.10, p < .01); mb(mid) =
3.94, p < .05); mb(high) = 10.46, p < .01). In other words it would be difficult
to find a task situation that required coordinating on inference in which this
strategy was not beneficial. This result is strong support for the discourse in-
ference constraint, which may explain the prevalence of this strategy in nat-
urally occurring dialogues [Sadock, 1978, Webber and Joshi, 1982, Cohen, 1987],
5.5 Zero Invalids Task
Remember that the Zero-Invalids Task is a fault-intolerant version of the task in
which any invalid intention invalidates the whole plan. Thus the Zero-Invalids
task provides an environment for testing hypotheses C2 and C4 with respect to
the inferences made explicit by the Close-Consequence strategy.
Figure 25 plots the mean performance differences between agents using the
Close-Consequence strategy and agents using the All-Implicit strategy in the
Zero-Invalids task. A two-way anova exploring the effect of awm and commu-
nicative strategy in this task, shows that awm has a large effect on performance
(F= 223.14, p< .000001). There is a main effect for communicative strategy (F
= 75.81, p < .001), and an interaction between awm and communicative choice
(F= 103.38, p< .000001).
The Close-Consequence strategy was detrimental in the Standard task for
low awm agents. Comparisons within awm ranges between agents using the
All-Implicit strategy and agents using the Close-Consequence strategy in the
Zero-Invalids task shows that there are no differences in performance for low
awm agents in the fault-intolerant Zero-Invalids task (mb(low) = 3.64, ns).
However, the Close-Consequence strategy is beneficial for mid and high awm
agents (mb(mid) = 26.62, p < .002); mb(high) = 267.72, p < .002). In other
words, this strategy is highly beneficial in increasing the robustness of the plan-
ning process by decreasing the frequency with which agents make mistakes. This
is a direct result of rehearsing the act-effect inferences, making it unlikely that
attention-limited agents will forget these important inferences.
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Figure 25: Close Consequence is beneficial for the Zero-Invalids Task for mid
and high awm agents. Strategy 1 is the combination of an All-Implicit agent
with a Close-Consequence agent and Strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents, Task
= Zero-Invalid, commcost = 0, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
6 Discussion
This paper showed how agents’ choice in communicative action can be de-
signed to mitigate the effect of their resource limits in the context of par-
ticular features of a collaborative planning task. In section 3, I presented a
model of collaborative planning in dialogue and discussed a number of param-
eters that can affect either the efficacy of the final plan or the efficiency of the
collaborative planning process. Then in section 5, I presented the results of
experiments testing hypotheses about the effects of these parameters on col-
laborative planning dialogues. These results contribute to the development
of the model of collaborative planning dialogue presented here. In addition,
since the testbed implementation is compatible with many current theories,
these results could be easily incorporated into other dialogue planning algo-
rithms [Logan et al., 1994, Traum, 1994, Guinn, 1994, Grosz and Sidner, 1990,
Levesque et al., 1990, Grosz and Kraus, 1993, Chu-Carrol and Carberry, 1995],
inter alia.
A secondary goal of this paper was to argue for a particular methodol-
ogy for dialogue theory development. The method was specified in section
4.1. The Design-World testbed was introduced in section 4 and sections 4.4
and 4.5 described the parameterizations of the model that support testing the
hypotheses. Four parameters for communicative strategies were tested: (1)
All-Implicit; (2) Close-Consequence; (3) Explicit-Warrant; and (4) Matched-
Pair-Inference-Explicit. Four parameters for tasks were tested: (1) Standard;
(2) Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs; (3) Matched-Pair (MP); (4) Zero-Invalid. Three
situations of varying processing effort were tested.
In this section, I will first summarize the hypotheses and the experimental
results in section 6.1, then I will discuss how the experimental results might
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generalize to situations not implemented in the testbed. Section 6.4 proposes
future work and section 6.5 consists of concluding remarks.
6.1 Summary of Results
The hypotheses that were generated by the statistical analysis of the dialogue
corpora are repeated below for convenience from sections 2 and 4.6.
• HYPOTH-C1: Agents produce Consequence IRUs to demonstrate that
they made the inference that is made explicit.
• HYPOTH-C2: Agents choose to produce Consequence IRUs to ensure
that the other agent has access to inferrable information.
• HYPOTH-C3: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to a measure of ‘how hard’ the inference is.
• HYPOTH-C4: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to a measure of ‘how important’ the inference is.
• HYPOTH-C5: The choice to produce a Consequence IRU is directly re-
lated to the degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on
the inferences that they have made.
• HYPOTH-A1: Agents produce Attention IRUs to support the processes
of deliberating beliefs and intentions.
• HYPOTH-A2: There is a discourse inference constraint whose ef-
fect is that inferences in dialogue are derived from propositions that are
currently discourse salient (in working memory).
• HYPOTH-A3: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree of inferential complexity of a task as measured by the number of
premises required to make task related inferences.
• HYPOTH-A4: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree to which an agent is resource limited in attentional capacity.
• HYPOTH-A5: The choice to produce an Attention IRU is related to the
degree to which the task requires agents to be coordinated on the infer-
ences that they have made.
• HYPOTH-I1: Strategies that reduce collaborative effort without affecting
quality of solution are beneficial.
Below I will summarize the experimental results reported in section 5 with
respect to the hypotheses above.
Hypotheses C3 and C4 were tested by comparing the Close-Consequence
strategy with the All-Implicit strategy in the Standard task. In this experi-
mental setup, the inference made explicit by the Consequence IRU was neither
hard to make nor critical for performance. Hypothesis C3 was only weakly
tested by the experiments because agents always make this inference. The re-
sults in figure 19 show that the Close-Consequence strategy is detrimental for
low awm agents. This is because IRUs can displace useful information from
working memory and because the inference made explicit with this IRU is not
‘hard enough’.
The Standard task also provides a weak test of hypothesis C4. The fact
that the Standard task is fault tolerant means that making the inference is not
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as critical as it might be. However, errors can results from either not making
the inference or forgetting it once it is made. At lower values of awm, the
probability of such errors is not that high. However, the results shown in figure
19 show that the probability of error is higher for high awm agents in this case,
because of their belief deliberation algorithm, and thus the Close-consequence
strategy is beneficial for high awm agents, even in the Standard task.
The Zero-Invalids task provides another test of hypothesis C4 by increasing
the importance of the inference made explicit by the Close-consequence strategy.
Figure 25 shows that hypothesis C4 is confirmed because the Close-Consequence
strategy is beneficial for low, mid and high awm agents. In addition to the
reasons discussed for the Standard task, this strategy is beneficial for high awm
agents because they have more potential to improve their scores by ensuring that
they don’t make errors.
The experiments did not test hypothesis C1 because agents in the testbed
are not designed to actively monitor evidence from other agents as to what
inferences they might have made. Hypothesis C5 was not tested by the exper-
iments because agents always rectify the situation if they detect a discrepancy
in beliefs about act effect inferences: they reject proposals whose preconditions
do not hold.
Hypotheses A1, A4 and A5 were tested by experiments in which the Explicit-
Warrant strategy was compared with the All-Implicit strategy in the Standard
task. Hypothesis A1 is disconfirmed for low awm agents. Figure 16 shows
that the Explicit-Warrant strategy is neither beneficial nor detrimental for low
awm agents for the Standard task, when processing is free. This counterintuitive
result arises because, when agents are highly resource limited, IRUs can displace
other information that is more useful.
To test hypothesis I1 in this situation, we also examined two situations where
processing is not free. When communication cost dominates other processing
costs, the Explicit Warrant strategy is detrimental for low and high awm
agents. However, when retrieval cost dominates other processing costs, the
Explicit Warrant strategy is beneficial for mid awm agents and there is a trend
toward a beneficial effect for high awm agents. Thus these two situations show
that hypothesis I1 is confirmed: processing effort has a major effect on whether
a strategy is beneficial.
We also tested hypotheses A1, A4 and A5 with experiments in which the
Explicit-Warrant strategy was compared with the All-Implicit strategy in the
Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task (see figures 20 and 21). This task increases the
importance of making deliberation based inferences by requiring agents to be
coordinated on these inferences in order to do well on the task. In this situation,
we saw a very large beneficial effect for the Explicit-Warrant strategy, which
is not diminished by increasing communication effort. Thus in situations in
which agents are required to be coordinated on these inferences, strategies which
include Attention IRUs can be very important.
Hypotheses A2, A3, A4, and A5 were tested by experiments comparing the
Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy with the All-Implicit strategy in the
two versions of the Matched-Pair task. The results shown in figures 22 and
23 provide support for these hypotheses. However these results also included
an unpredicted benefit of Attention IRUs for inferentially complex tasks where
agents must coordinate on inferences. Figure 23 shows that both mid and high
awm agents’ performance improves with the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit
strategy. This can be explained by the fact that Attention IRUs increase the
likelihood that agents will make the same inference, rather than divergent
inferences, when multiple inferences are possible.
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Furthermore, although the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy is specif-
ically tied to Matched-Pair inferences, it provides a test of a general strategy
for making premises for inferences salient, when tasks are inferentially com-
plex and require agents to remain coordinated on inferences. Thus it pro-
vides strong support for the discourse inference constraint. To gen-
eralize this strategy to other cases of plan-related inferences, the clauses in
the strategy plan operator that specifically refer to matched-pair inferences
can be replaced with a more general inference, e.g. the more general (Gen-
erates ?act1 ∧ ?act2 ?act3), where the generates relation is to be inferred
[Pollack, 1986, Grosz and Sidner, 1990, Di Eugenio, 1993].
Hypothesis I1 was tested by examining extremes in cost ratios for retrieval
effort and communication effort whenever a hypothesis about the beneficial ef-
fects of IRUs was confirmed. Figure 18 shows that high communication effort
can make the Explicit-Warrant strategy detrimental in the Standard task. Fig-
ure 21 shows that high communication effort does not eliminate the benefits of
the Explicit-Warrant strategy in the Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs task. Figure and
24 shows that high communication effort does not eliminate the benefits of the
Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit strategy in the Matched-Pair-Two-Room task.
Thus the strategy of making premises for inferences salient is robust against
extremes in processing effort.
6.2 Generalizability of the Results
This section addresses concerns raised in [Hanks et al., 1993] that simulation is
‘ experimentation in the small’. Hanks writes that ([Hanks et al., 1993], section
5.1.5):
The ultimate value– arguably the only value – of experimentation
is to constrain or otherwise inform the designer of a system that
solves interesting problems. In order to do so the experimenter must
demonstrate three things:
1. that her results – the relationships she demonstrates between
agent characteristics and world characteristics – extend beyond
the particular agent, world, and problem specification she stud-
ied,
2. that the solution to the problem area she studied in isolation
will be applicable when that same problem area is encountered
in a larger, more complex world, and
3. that the relationship demonstrated experimentally actually con-
strains or somehow guides the design of a larger more realistic
agent.
The list in 1 to 3 are all different ways of saying that the results should
generalize beyond the specifics of the experiment, and this after all is a basic
issue with all experimental work. Typically generalizations can be shown by
a series of multiple experiments modifying multiple variables as we have done
here. For example, the modifications to the task are specifically designed to test
whether beneficial communicative strategies generalize across tasks. However,
we might also ask to what extent do the variables manipulated in the simula-
tion abstract out key properties of real situations? Below I will briefly discuss
why the results presented above are potentially generalizable. I will focus on
generalizations along three dimensions: (1) task (or environmental) properties;
(2) agent architectural properties; and (3) agent behaviors. These dimensions
are the same as those in Cohen’s ‘ecological triangle’ [Cohen et al., 1989].
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Generalizations about tasks The Design-World task was selected as a sim-
ple planning task that requires negotiation of each step. The structure of this
task is isomorphic to a subcomponent of many collaborative planning tasks. In
addition, to test generalizability of hypothesized benefits across tasks, we exam-
ined more complex variants of the task by manipulating three abstract features:
(1) inferential complexity as measured by the number of premises required for
making a task related inference and (2) degree of belief coordination required
on intentions, inferences and beliefs underlying a plan; and (3) the task deter-
minacy and fault tolerance of the plan. These general features can certainly be
applied to other tasks in other domains. In fact it is difficult to think of a task
or domain in which these features could not be applied.
Generalizations about agent properties Design-World agents are artifi-
cial agents that are designed to model the resource limited qualities of human
agents. The planning and deliberation aspects of human processing are modeled
with the IRMA architecture, and resource limits on these processes are mod-
eled by extending the IRMA architecture with a model of Attention/Working
Memory (awm) which has been shown to model a limited but critical set of
properties of human processing. The way that agents process dialogue is tied
to the agent architecture.
The experimental results will extend to dialogues between artificial agents
to the extent that those agents exhibit similar cognitive properties. Here, we
looked at a resource bound on access to memory as modeled by a size of memory
subset limit, however size is directly correlated to time to access memory. Arti-
ficial agents are often time limited in rapidly changing worlds, so it seems quite
plausible that artificial agents would benefit from similar communicative strate-
gies. For example, I would predict that agents in the Phoenix simulation testbed
would benefit from the strategies discussed here [Cohen et al., 1989]. In other
work artificial agents do ‘make inferences explicit’ by communicating to other
agents partial computations when the other agent might have been able to make
these computations [Cohen et al., 1989, Durfee et al., 1987, Turner, 1994]. In
addition, defining inferential complexity as a direct consequence of the num-
ber of premises simultaneously in memory bears a strong resemblance to prob-
lems artificial processors have when a computation requires a large working set
[Stone, 1987].
The experimental results should extend to dialogues between humans and
artificial agents because Design-World agents are designed to model humans.
However it may be desirable to change the definition of collaborative effort for
modeling human-computer interaction to allow the computer to handle process-
ing that is easy for the computer to do and for the human to handle processing
that is easy for the human to do. Furthermore, most of the claims about the
awm model are based on a limited set of human working memory properties,
and these properties will also hold for other cognitively based architectures such
as SOAR [Laird et al., 1987, Lehman et al., 1991].
Generalizations about agent behaviors In this work the agent behaviors
that were tested were the agent communication strategies. One reason to believe
that the strategies are general to human-human discourse is that they were based
on observed strategies in different corpora of natural collaborative planning dia-
logues. It is possible to find all three types of IRUs in the Trains, Map-Task and
Design corpora [Traum, 1991, Carletta, 1992, Pollack et al., 1982, Whittaker et al., 1993],
as well as in the financial advice domain.
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In addition to this empirical evidence, there are further reasons why we
might expect generalizations.
The communicative acts and discourse acts used by Design-World agents
are similar to those used in [Carletta, 1992, Cawsey et al., 1992, Sidner, 1994,
Stein and Thiel, 1993]. Thus communicative strategies based on these acts
should be implementable in any of these systems.
The experimental results based on these strategies should generalize to other
discourse situations because the strategies are based on general relations be-
tween utterance acts and underlying processes, such as supporting deliberation
and inference. For example, the mapping of a warrant relation between an
act and a belief in naturally occurring examples such as 9b was modeled with a
warrant relation between an act and a belief in Design-World, as seen in the
Explicit-Warrant communication strategy. The claims made about the use of
the Explicit-Warrant communication strategy should generalize to any dialogue
planning domain where agents use warrants to support deliberation.
Similarly, content based inferences in natural dialogues such as that dis-
cussed in relation to example 11 were modeled with content based inferences in
Design-World such as those required for doing well on the Matched-Pair tasks.
This inferential situation was designed to test the discourse inference con-
straint, that inferences in dialogue are restricted to premises that are cur-
rently salient. Both experimental and corpus based evidence was provided in
support of the discourse inference constraint. The claims made about the use of
the Matched-Pair-Inference-Explicit communication strategy, based on experi-
mental evidence, should generalize to any dialogue strategy where agents make
premises for inferences available, and to any planning domain where agents are
required to make content based inferences in support of deliberation or planning.
The evaluation metrics applied to these strategies should also generalize
whenever domain plan utility is a reasonable measure of the quality of solution
for a dialogue task.
6.3 Relation to Other Work
The model of collaborative planning dialogues presented in section 3 draws from
previous work on cooperative dialogue [Webber and Joshi, 1982, Pollack et al., 1982,
Litman, 1985, Pollack, 1986, Joshi et al., 1986, Grosz and Sidner, 1986, Finin et al., 1986,
Carberry, 1989, Clark and Schaefer, 1989, Whittaker and Stenton, 1988, Grosz and Sidner, 1990,
Cohen, 1987], and the results are applicable to other current research on collabo-
rative planning [Sidner, 1994, Cohen and Levesque, 1991, Heeman and Hirst, 1995,
Chu-Carrol and Carberry, 1995, Guinn, 1994, Traum, 1994, Dahlback, 1991, Lochbaum, 1994,
Grosz and Kraus, 1993, Young et al., 1994].
The agent architecture and the model of deliberation and means-end rea-
soning is based on the work of [Bratman et al., 1988] and [Doyle, 1992], and
on Pollack’s TileWorld simulation environment [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990].
The use of IRMA as an underlying model of intention deliberation to provide
a basis for a collaborative planning model was first proposed in [Walker, 1992,
Walker, 1993a, Walker, 1993b], and has been incorporated into other work [Grosz and Kraus, 1993,
Young et al., 1994]. The architecture includes a specific model of limited work-
ing memory, but most of the claims about the model are based on its recency
and frequency properties, which might also be provided by other cognitively
based architectures such as SOAR[Laird et al., 1987, Lehman et al., 1991]. 22
22[Walker, 1995a] discusses the differences between an awm-like attentional model and
Grosz and Sidner’s stack model of attentional state [Grosz and Sidner, 1986, Sidner, 1979,
Grosz, 1977]. See also [Rose et al., 1995] for a discussion of other discourse phenomena for
which the awm model may be useful.
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Since the testbed architecture is consistent with that assumed in other work,
the experimental results should be generalizable to those frameworks.
The relationship between discourse acts and domain-based options and inten-
tions in this work is based on Litman’s model of discourse plans [Litman, 1985,
Litman and Allen, 1990] and is similar to the approach in [Carletta, 1992, Cawsey et al., 1992,
Traum, 1994]. The emphasis on autonomy at each stage of the planning pro-
cess and the belief reasoning mechanism of Design-World agents is based on
the theory of belief revision and the multi-agent simulation environment de-
veloped in the Automated Librarian project [Galliers, 1989, Galliers, 1991a,
Cawsey et al., 1992, Logan et al., 1994].
The Design-World testbed is based on the methods used in the TileWorld and
Phoenix simulation environments: rapidly changing robot worlds in which an ar-
tificial agent attempts to optimize reasoning and planning [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990,
Hanks et al., 1993, Cohen et al., 1989]. TileWorld is a single agent world in
which the agent interacts with its environment, rather than with another agent.
Design-World uses similar methods to test a theory of the effect of resource
limits on communicative behavior between two agents.
Design-World is also based on the method used in Carletta’s JAM simulation
for the Edinburgh Map-Task [Power, 1974, Carletta, 1992]. JAM is based on
the Map-Task Dialogue corpus, where the goal of the task is for the planning
agent, the instructor, to instruct the reactive agent, the instructee, how to get
from one place to another on the map. JAM focuses on efficient strategies for
recovery from error and parametrizes agents according to their communicative
and error recovery strategies. Given good error recovery strategies, Carletta
argues that ‘high risk’ communicative strategies are more efficient, but did not
attempt to quantify efficiency. In contrast, the approach here provides a way
of quantifying what is an effective or efficient strategy, and the results suggest
that a combination of the agents’ resource limitations and the task definition
determine when strategies are efficient. Future work could test Carletta’s claims
about recovery strategies within this extended framework.
To my knowledge, none of this earlier work has considered the factors that
affect the range of variation in communicative choice, or the effects of different
choices, or measured how communicative choice affects the construction of a
collaborative plan and the ability of the conversants to stay coordinated. Nor
have other theories of collaborative planning been explicit about the agent ar-
chitecture, or tested specific ideas about resource bounds in dialogue, and none
have used utility as the basis for agents’ communicative choice. In addition, no
earlier work on cooperative task-oriented dialogue argued that conversational
agents’ resource limits and task complexity are major factors in determining
effective conversational strategies in collaboration.
6.4 Future Work
A promising avenue for future work is to investigate beneficial strategies for
teams of heterogeneous agents. In the experiments here, pairs of agents in
dialogue were always parameterized with the same resource limits. Pilot studies
of dialogues between heterogeneous agents suggest that strategies that are not
effective for homogeneous agents may be effective for heterogeneous ones. For
example, in [Walker, 1993b] I tested an Attention IRU strategy in which agents
would tell one another about all the options they knew about at the beginning
of planning each room. This strategy is not beneficial for homogeneous agents
because IRUs can displace other useful information. However if one agent is
not limited, then it can be helpful for the resource limited agent to exploit the
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capabilities of the more capable agent by telling the other agent important facts
before it forgets them.
Another extension would be to extend the agent communication strategies
or to test additional ones. For example, other work proposes a number of strate-
gies for information selection and ordering in dialogue and provides some evi-
dence that these strategies are efficient or efficacious [Carenini and Moore, 1993,
Suthers, 1993, Zukerman and McConachy, 1993, Chu-Carrol and Carberry, 1995].
Support for these claims could be provided by Design-World experiments in
which agents used these strategies to communicate.
Future work could also modify the properties of the world or of the task.
For example, it would be possible to make Design-World more like Tileworld
by making the world change in the course of the task, by adding or removing
furniture.
These results may also be incorporated as input into decision algorithms in
which agents decide online which strategy to pursue, and investigate additional
factors that determine when strategies are effective in collaborative planning
dialogues. The results presented here show what information an agent should
consider. For example, a comparison between low, mid and high awm agents
shows how to design decision algorithms for agents who have to decide whether
to expend additional effort.
Another promising avenue is make the agents capable of remembering and
learning from past mistakes so that they can adapt their strategies to the situ-
ation [Alterman et al., 1991].
Finally, these results should be incorporated into the design of multi-agent
problem-solving systems and into systems for human-computer communication,
such as those for teaching, advice and explanation, where for example the use
of particular strategies might be premised on the abilities of the learner or
apprentice.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper was to show how agents’ choice in communicative action,
their algorithms for language behavior, can be designed to mitigate the effect
of their resource limits in the context of particular features of a collaborative
planning task. In this paper, I first motivate a number of hypotheses based on
a statistical analysis of natural collaborative planning dialogues. Then a func-
tional model of collaborative planning dialogues is developed based on these
hypotheses, including parameters that are hypothesized to affect the general-
izability of the model. The model is then implemented in a testbed in which
these parameters can be varied, and the hypotheses are tested.
The method used here can be contrasted with other work on dialogue mod-
eling. Much previous work on dialogue modeling only carries out part of the
process described above: only the initial part of the process up to specifying a
functional model is completed. Followon research that is based on these mod-
els must judge the model according to subjective criteria such as how well it
fits researcher’s intuitions or how elegant the model is. The models developed
here on the basis of empirical evidence can also be judged according to these
subjective criteria, but this work carries out additional steps to further test and
refine the model suggested by the corpus analysis. Implementing a model with
parameters to test the generalizability of the model and testing hypotheses in
a testbed implementation provides a way to check subjective evaluations and
suggests many ways in which our initial hypotheses must be refined and further
tested.
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The Design-World testbed is the first testbed for conversational systems
that systematically introduces several different types of independent parameters
that are hypothesized to affect the efficacy of a collaborative plan negotiated
through a dialogue, and the efficiency of that dialogue process. Experiments
in the testbed examined the interaction between (1) agents’ resource limits in
attentional capacity and inferential capacity; (2) agents’ choice in communica-
tion; and (3) features of communicative tasks that affect task difficulty such as
inferential complexity, degree of belief coordination required, and tolerance for
errors. The results verified a number of hypotheses that depended on particu-
lar assumptions about agents’ resource limits that were not possible to test by
corpus analysis alone.
Several unpredicted and counterintuitive results were also demonstrated by
the experiments. First, the task property of belief coordination in combina-
tion with resource limits (as in the Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs and Matched-Pair
tasks), were shown to produce the most robust benefits for IRUs, rather than
resource limits alone as originally hypothesized. Second, I predicted that IRUs
would always be beneficial for low awm agents, but found that IRUs can be
detrimental for these agents through a side effect of displacing other, more use-
ful, beliefs from working memory. Third, it would seem plausible that high
awm agents should always perform better than either low or mid awm agents
since these agents always have access to more information. However the results
showed that there are two situations in which this is not an advantage: (1) when
accessing information has some cost; and (2) when access to multiple beliefs can
lead agents to make divergent inferences. In this case, restricting agents to a
small shared working set is a natural way to limit inferential processes. This
limit intuitively corresponds to potential benefits of limited working memory
for humans and explains how humans manage to coordinate on inferences in
conversation [Levinson, 1985, Grosz, 1977, Joshi, 1978].
These results clearly demonstrate that factors not previously considered in
dialogue models must be taken into account of claims if cooperativity, efficiency,
or efficacy are to be supported. In addition, I have shown that a theory of dia-
logue that includes a model of resource-limited processing can account for both
the observed language behavior in human-human dialogue and the experimental
results presented here.
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